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Article
Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change:
The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy
BLAKE HUDSON
Recent research demonstrates the difficulties that federal systems of government may
present for international treaty formation, a prime example being legally binding treaties
aimed at harnessing global forests to regulate climate change. Some federal constitutions,
such as the U.S. and Canadian constitutions, grant subnational governments virtually
exclusive direct forest management regulatory authority for non-federally owned forests.
With subnational governments controlling sixty-five percent of forests in the United States
and eighty-four percent in Canada, the U.S. and Canadian federal governments may be
constrained during international negotiations and unable to legally bind subnational
governments to any agreement prescribing methods of utilizing these forests to combat
climate change. These constraints are especially important since these two countries
control fifteen percent of the world’s forests. Decentralized forest policy in the U.S. and
Canada certainly provides valuable benefits. Yet constitutional decentralization in federal
systems should be more effectively balanced with global forest governance if that
mechanism for addressing climate change is to be preserved in its most flexible form.
Though a binding agreement has yet to materialize, and other increasingly touted
mechanisms may be utilized to tackle climate change, it is imperative that world
governments maintain every legal and policy tool at their disposal to address the problem.
A recent comparative constitutional analysis of five federal systems controlling fiftyfour percent of global forests determined that the United States and Canada lack two of the
three key elements of federal constitutional structure that best facilitate a federal nation’s
ability to enter into and successfully implement an international climate agreement
including forests while also preserving the recognized benefits of decentralized forest
policy. This Article addresses how these constitutional deficiencies might be remedied to
achieve more effective climate and forest governance. In other words, the Article explores
mechanisms for establishing “Fail-safe Federalism” for forest management in the United
States and Canada, by first highlighting the domestic nuances of both constitutional
structure and forest policy in the two countries and next assessing whether top-down,
bilateral, horizontal, or transnational approaches are the most effective mechanisms for
forging Fail-safe Federalism within each.
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Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change:
The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy
BLAKE HUDSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is perhaps the most important environmental issue of
our time. Yet it is also the most complex. While it is difficult to craft a
regulatory solution or a cooperative response among nations for most
global governance issues, it is especially challenging in the case of climate
change. Scientific uncertainty regarding climate change’s potential
impacts, the difficulties in measuring and predicting changing climatic
conditions, the global scale of the problem, the innumerable sources of
greenhouse gases, the role of those sources in forming the very carbonconstructed foundation upon which society operates, and the political and
jurisdictional complexities arising out of these factors make climate change
an exceptionally difficult environmental and global governance challenge.
It is therefore imperative that world governments and citizens both
maintain and are able to effectively use every legal and policy tool at their
disposal in the battle against climate change. More specifically, the global
nature of the problem requires that each nation be able to successfully
utilize mechanisms of domestic governance to forge a collaborative
international response. Such a response could take many forms, ranging
*
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from individualized action by single nations, to transnational actions,1 to a
legally binding global treaty. Even so, the utilization of a global treaty
may be diminished, as recent scholarship demonstrates that domestic
governance limitations in the form of constitutional federalism may
complicate the implementation of a non-self-executing, legally binding
climate change treaty or perhaps even thwart treaty formation in the first
instance.2
Countries with federal systems of government, such as the United
States and Canada, pose a particular challenge to a variety of international
negotiations3 because regulatory authority over treaty subject matter may
be constitutionally decentralized4 and divided in an exclusive manner
between the national and subnational governments.
As a result,
subnational governments may legally constrain national governments
during international negotiations by resisting domestic treaty
implementation as outside the scope of the national government’s

1

These include voluntary or other arrangements between select groups of nations and/or nongovernmental organizations. Scholars have highlighted a recent trend toward bottom-up and flexible
transnational approaches to engaging in global environmental governance in the absence of a
centralized, legally binding international arrangement. See Kenneth Abbott, The Transnational Regime
Complex for Climate Change, ENVTL. & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y (forthcoming); Daniel Bodansky, A
Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime, (Ariz. St. C. of Law,
Working Paper, March 7, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1773865.
2
See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in
Regulating Climate Change, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3) [hereinafter Hudson,
Federal Constitutions] (noting that federalism within a nation’s constitution may complicate efforts to
forge non-self-executing legally binding climate change treaties); Blake Hudson, Climate Change,
Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 369 (2011)
[hereinafter Hudson, Climate Change] (noting how federalism restrains the United States’ ability to
implement international climate change treaties); Blake Hudson & Erika Weinthal, Seeing the Global
Forest for the Trees: How U.S. Federalism Can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT.
RESOURCES POL’Y RES. 353, 353–54 (2009) (explaining how in the United States, federalism
complicates efforts to execute any legally binding climate change treaty that includes forests).
3
Examples include negotiations related not only to the environment, but also human rights,
criminal law and punishment, and commerce and trade. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 402–06 (1998).
4
Scholars have observed that
federations use the principle of constitutional non-centralization rather than
decentralization. In other words, when independent states decide to create a
federation and a federal system of government, they confer, generally through a
constitution, certain specific responsibilities and authorities to the federal
government in the interest of all states. . . . [F]or these reasons, use of the term
decentralized is somewhat awkward in the case of federal governments.
Hans M. Gregersen et al., Forest Governance in Federal Systems: An Overview of Experiences and
Implications for Decentralization, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND
POWER 13, 14–15 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005).
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5

constitutional authority. The complications presented by federal systems
of government for international negotiations have critical implications for
global climate governance—at least to the extent that countries wish to
preserve a legally binding treaty as one mechanism for addressing climate
change. Worldwide there are only twenty-four federal systems of
government6 compared to over 160 unitary systems.7 Thus, only thirteen
percent of the world’s governments are federal and subject to potential
legal constraints posed by subnational governments.8 Yet while there are
far fewer federal systems of government than unitary systems,
approximately forty-six percent of the world’s land base9 (and associated
natural resources) and between seventy and eighty percent of the world’s
forests10—a resource crucial to combating climate change11—are contained
5
By contrast, nation-states with centralized, or “unitary,” systems of government may act without
legal constraint during international negotiations—the lack of exclusive subnational constitutional
authority over certain subject matters in these countries allows central governments to freely obligate
their respective nations to the requirements of a legally binding treaty. “Unitary” systems of
government “may have subnational levels of governments; but these are not constitutionally
empowered to make decisions on major government services and functions; rather, they are subordinate
units,” id. at 15, intended to “balance the burden of governance.” Ian Ferguson & Cherukat
Chandrasekharan, Paths and Pitfalls of Decentralization for Sustainable Forest Management:
Experiences of the Asia Pacific Region, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 4, at 63,
65.
6
Federalism by Country, F. FED., http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/by_country/index.php
(last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
7
Unitary State, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state (last visited Dec. 16,
2011).
8
Unitary action at the national level may certainly be politically thwarted by subnational interest
groups or powerful subnational government influence, but unitary governments maintain the legal
authority to act if and when they politically choose to do so. In federal systems, even in the presence of
national government political will, any one subnational actor may challenge a national act as
unconstitutional and may succeed in having national regulatory action thwarted.
9
The total surface area of the earth is 148,940,000 km2. Federal systems of government maintain
the following surface areas: Argentina: 2,766,890 km2; Australia: 7,617,930 km2; Austria: 83,872 km2;
Belgium: 30,528 km2; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 51,209 km2; Brazil: 8,514,877 km2; Canada: 9,984,670
km2; Comoros: 2,235 km2; Ethiopia: 1,104,300 km2; Germany: 357,021 km2; India: 3,287,263 km2;
Iraq: 438,317 km2; Malaysia: 329,847 km2; Mexico: 1,972,550 km2; Micronesia: 702 km2; Nepal:
147,181 km2; Nigeria: 923,768 km2; Pakistan: 796,095 km2; Russia: 17,075,400 km2; Saint Kitts and
Nevis: 261 km2; Sudan: 2,505,813 km2; Switzerland: 41,285 km2; United Arab Emirates: 83,600 km2;
United States: 9,826,675 km2; Venezuela: 916,445 km2. Thus, federal nation total surface area is
68,858,734 km2, or roughly forty-six percent of the world’s total surface area. See Countries of the
World Ordered by Land Area, LIST OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
http://www.listofcountriesoftheworld.com/area-land.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
10
Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla et al., Forest Governance in Countries with Federal Systems of
Government,
39
GOVERNANCE
BRIEF
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/GovBrief/GovBrief0739E.pdf.
11
See A. Angelsen, REDD Models and Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465, 465 (2008)
(explaining how environmental non-governmental organizations have come to realize that failing to
address tropical deforestation is dangerous, given that deforestation currently accounts for one fifth of
global greenhouse gas emissions); T. Johns et. al., A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating
Government, Public and Private Forest Stewards Into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L
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within federal systems of government. This is both the great irony and the
great challenge of our time: the placement of the vast majority of one of
the most critical resources to combating global climate change largely
within systems of government with the greatest potential to complicate
holistic global responses through international legal instruments.
The role of the United States and Canada in climate change and global
forest management negotiations provides a compelling case study of the
potential impact of federal systems on global governance via international
treaty. The international community is increasingly looking to harness the
power of carbon sequestration via improved forest management as a
mechanism to combat climate change,12 and “realization of the significance
of climate change impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation has brought renewed impetus to efforts to conserve
and better manage forests globally.”13 Nearly twenty percent of annual
global carbon emissions result from forest loss and degradation,14 an
amount greater than emitted by the global transportation sector each year.15
As a result, mechanisms to achieve “Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation” (REDD) have been placed on the agenda
of both future international climate negotiations and negotiations related to
establishing a global sustainable forest management regime. 16 Not only is
forest destruction a substantial source of atmospheric carbon, but a recent
U.S. Forest Service report found that one-third of global carbon emissions
are absorbed by forests each year, making forests the most significant
terrestrial carbon sink.17 Consequently, preservation of forests provides a
multiplied effect in regulating greenhouse gases; and, correspondingly,
forest destruction amplifies concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere
FORESTRY REV. 458, 459 (noting that the role of deforestation in global climate change is widely
recognized amongst science and policy experts); A. Karsenty et. al., Summary of the Proceedings of the
International Workshop “The International Regime, Avoided Deforestation and the Evolution of Public
and Private Policies Towards Forests in Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21–23rd November
2007, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 424, 424 (2008) (noting how the role of forests in effecting climate
change reforms is increasingly emphasized); K. Levin et al., The Climate Regime as Global Forest
Governance: Can Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives
Pass a ‘Dual Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538, 539 (2008) (noting consensus
amongst experts that the world’s forests are under stress).
12
See Levin, supra note 11, at 539 (describing how environmental groups, firms, industry
associations, and governments are focusing on forest management policies to address climate change).
13
CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 4 (2010).
14
Id. at 6.
15
Erin C. Myers, Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD),
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 4 (2007), http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-07-50.pdf.
16
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 6.
17
News Release, USDA Forest Service, US Forest Service Finds Global Forests Absorb OneThird of Carbon Emissions Annually (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/news/2011/
releases/07/carbon.shtml.
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since it constitutes both a source of carbon and the loss of a significant
carbon sink.
The United States and Canada alone account for over thirteen percent
of the world’s land base,18 over fifteen percent of the world’s forests,19 and
maintain two of the top ten world economies as measured by annual gross
domestic product20—carbon-based economies to be certain. With these
two nations controlling such a significant amount of the world’s natural
and financial capital, full and unconstrained participation by the United
States and Canada in international climate negotiations is of crucial
importance if that route of response is ultimately chosen. Even so, the
involvement of these two federal systems in global climate governance
related to forests is hindered by legal constraints that subnational
governments may place on national government involvement in
international negotiations.
For example, U.S. regulatory authority over forest management is
currently constitutionally divided between federal and state governments,
with state governments responsible for regulating the nearly sixty-five
percent of U.S. forests owned by subnational governments (five percent) or
private parties (sixty percent).21 As a result, if the federal government
sought to obligate the United States to certain types of forest management
directives within an international climate treaty, it may arguably do so only
on the thirty-five percent of nationally owned forests over which it
maintains constitutional control.22 This is because a non-self-executing
treaty would require Congress to pass implementing legislation that would
invariably be challenged by state governments and private property owners
as beyond the scope of the U.S. treaty power and other federal powers, and
as intruding upon a regulatory role constitutionally reserved to state
governments. Thus nearly two-thirds of the United States’ forested lands
would be outside the orbit of the treaty, rendering the United States in
violation of its international obligations. Furthermore, the United States
would likely be less inclined to even enter into serious international
negotiations based upon perceived federalism constraints. In this way
18

See Countries of the World Ordered by Land Area, supra note 9.
Of the world’s approximately four billion hectares of forest, Canada maintains 310 million
hectares and the United States 302 million hectares. JACEK P. SIRY ET AL., XIII WORLD FORESTRY
CONGRESS, GLOBAL FOREST OWNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREST PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT,
AND PROTECTION 3 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/external/
global_forest_ownership_FD.pdf.
20
World Economic Outlook Database, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx.
21
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), available at http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO3/english/pdf.htm (follow
“Forests” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
22
See id. (noting that the federal government publically owns and manages only thirty-five
percent of forests in the country).
19

932

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:925

legal perception is often political reality in the United States, as the
government politically refuses to act both domestically and internationally
based upon perceived constitutional constraints.23
The consequences of this constitutional state of affairs for U.S. forests
are substantial. The U.S. Forest Service recently released a report detailing
the projected impacts that population growth, urbanization, climate change,
timber markets, and invasive species will have on southeastern U.S. forests
alone over the next fifty years, finding that these factors may reduce forest
cover by as much as twenty-three million acres, or approximately thirteen
percent of total forestland in the south.24 Not surprisingly, southeastern
U.S. forests also maintain the highest proportion of private forest
ownership,25 meaning that under current understandings of constitutional
law, a prescriptive regulatory response at national or international levels
may be an unavailable mechanism for avoiding this dramatic loss of U.S.
forest cover and the carbon sequestration and other ecosystem service
benefits forests provide.
Similarly, the Canadian Constitution grants the provinces exclusive
forest management regulatory authority over non-federally owned forests.
Thus the provinces maintain control over nearly all of the nation’s forests
since eighty-four percent of Canadian forests are owned by the provinces
or private parties.26 The provinces place even more constraints on the
Canadian national government in international negotiations than do the
states in the United States because while U.S. state hegemony over
23
See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14) (describing how the U.S.
government “acts as if its hands are tied due to perceived legal constraints”). Curtis Bradley has
observed that “in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S.
officials declined to enter into negotiations concerning private international law treaties because of a
concern that the treaties would infringe on the reserved powers of the states.” Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 131–32 (2000) (citing Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules
of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954), and HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE FEDERAL STATE 187–88 (1931)). Additionally, the United States has invoked federalism and
states’ rights to avoid international treaties related to labor conditions. Id. at 132. Perceived federalism
limitations have also reduced the United States’ bargaining power during international negotiations as
the United States has sought both treaty exemptions to reduce state obligations and concessions for
states in domestic implementation. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 408–10 (2003). Examples include the United States’ opposition to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, treaty exemptions for the states within human rights treaties,
and the Agreement on Government Procurement, and concessions to the states in domestic
implementation of trade matters, such as in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Id. at 408–10.
24
DAVID N. WEAR & JOHN G. GREIS, U.S. FOREST SERV., THE SOUTHERN FOREST FUTURES
PROJECT: SUMMARY REPORT 26–31, 35 (2011), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/
reports/draft/summary_report.pdf.
25
Eighty-six percent of Southeastern forests are privately owned. Id. at 58.
26
CAN. COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 4,
(2010), available at http://www.sfmcanada.org/english/pdf/SFMBooklet_E_US.pdf. (last visited Jul.
25, 2011).
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subnational forest management has been understood as a “reserved power”
for the states in the absence of a recognized enumerated federal power,
Canadian provincial hegemony over forests is made explicit in the text of
the Canadian Constitution. So while the United States may have some
flexibility to exert federal authority over subnational forests under the
Commerce Clause or some other federal power (though direct regulation
has never before been attempted), the Canadian federal government’s
options are expressly limited. In addition, and also unlike the United
States, Canadian courts have definitively found that the Canadian treaty
power is constrained by reserved provincial powers.
Ultimately, the lack of national or international input into Canadian
forest practices also has implications for preserving the full slate of climate
change solutions. While Canadian boreal forests store a great deal of
carbon—an estimated sixty-seven billion tons (equal to 303 years of the
country’s 2002 carbon emissions)—deforestation of nearly 230,000 acres
of forest a year due to cropland conversion and urbanization is a significant
source of emissions.27 At this rate, over eleven million acres of Canadian
forest will be lost over the next fifty years. This is in addition to logging
activities that remove an average of 122 megatons of carbon dioxide
equivalent forest carbon a year, an amount that if released into the
atmosphere would equal sixteen percent of Canada’s total yearly
greenhouse gas emissions.28 Without greater coordination of forest policy,
either among the provinces or provided by some higher governmental
authority, destruction of forests in the name of economic development may
proceed apace as provinces jockey for economic growth and
development.29
Ultimately, if utilization of full treaty-making authority is to be
preserved in the context of climate change and appropriately balanced with
the benefits of decentralized forest governance, federal systems like the
United States and Canada will need to overcome the holistic resource
management problems posed by federalism. In other words, mechanisms
for forging “Fail-safe Federalism”30 will need to be established in the event
that U.S. states or Canadian provinces do not unilaterally act to protect
their respective forests in ways consistent with the needs of a robust global
27
WORLD
WILDLIFE
FED’N,
CANADA’S
BOREAL
FORESTS,
available
at
assets.panda.org/downloads/canada_forest_cc_final_13nov07_lr_1.pdf. (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
28
FORESTETHICS, ROBBING THE CARBON BANK: GLOBAL WARMING & ONTARIO’S BOREAL
FOREST 3 n.2, available at http://forestethics.org/downloads/globalwarming_2.pdf (last visited Dec. 16,
2011).
29
See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons Governance, 63
ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3, 4) (explaining how the lack of coordination at the
federal level could potentially give rise to a natural capital commons within national and state
boundaries).
30
Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26).
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climate change response. Such mechanisms would allow these countries’
federal governments to have the constitutional authority to act as a fail-safe
by participating in the establishment of national forest objectives based
upon minimum forest protection standards—standards that may need to be
coordinated on a global scale to effectively address climate change. This
Article analyzes the various mechanisms that may be utilized to facilitate
Fail-safe Federalism in the context of global forest governance and climate
change, proceeding in five parts.
Part II provides background and context for how both the U.S. and
Canadian brands of constitutional federalism impact global climate
governance related to forest management through their lack of previously
identified elements that best balance global forest governance and
decentralized forest policy-making in federal systems of government. This
Part first describes the foundational research upon which this Article
builds, detailing the elements of federal constitutional orders that best
strike that balance. Next, this part details how the U.S. and Canadian
constitutional orders are missing certain of those elements. Part III then
clarifies that despite the similar potential impacts of U.S. and Canadian
constitutional federalism on global governance, different domestic
circumstances give rise to widely divergent domestic forest policies
between the two countries—with Canadian provinces providing a higher
baseline of minimum forest management standards upon which to build
toward effective global forest governance, while the United States
maintains more constitutional authority and flexibility at the federal level
to allow participation in binding international agreements.
These
distinctions have important implications for which mechanisms of forging
Fail-safe Federalism are most appropriate in the respective countries. Part
IV then assesses the various mechanisms by which the constitutional
orders of the United States and Canada might be fortified to allow more
robust, forest-driven responses to climate change on a global scale. These
fail-safes may be driven by internal forces and forged from the current
constitutional order, or they may be driven by external forces, such as
transnational pressure to change domestic forest policies. Importantly, the
fail-safes that allow the U.S. and Canadian national governments to act
unconstrained in global forest and climate governance will also allow the
national governments to perform a fail-safe role domestically—thus
striking the global forest governance/decentralized forest policy balance.
Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: U.S. AND CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPACTS ON GLOBAL CLIMATE AND FOREST GOVERNANCE
Though the international community has increasingly sought
mechanisms to utilize global forest management to more effectively
combat climate change, efforts over the past two decades to harmonize
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national and local forest policies within a legally binding international
treaty have failed.31 This failure is driven both by political disconnects
between the developed and developing worlds32 and the international
community’s inability to gain the unequivocal support of leading
developed nations like the United States.33 Notwithstanding past failures,
the international community is increasingly seeking to develop
mechanisms to facilitate direct inclusion of forest management within a
future climate agreement.34 Even so, recent scholarship demonstrates that
certain federal systems of government maintain constitutional structures
insufficient to adequately balance sustainable, decentralized domestic
forest governance with effective negotiation and implementation of a

31
Since the late 1980s, nations have made numerous attempts to negotiate a legally binding
international forest treaty, though each has failed. Various international fora have facilitated these
negotiations: the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de
Janeiro; four sessions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) between 1995 and 1997; four
rounds of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) between 1997 and 2000; and, most recently,
numerous sessions of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) in the 2000s. See Radoslav S.
Dimitrov et al., International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda, 9 INT’L STUD. REV. 230, 243 (2007);
accord Deborah S. Davenport & Peter Wood, Finding the Way Forward for the International
Arrangement on Forests: UNFF-5, -6, and -7, 15 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 316, 316
(2006); S. Guéneau & P. Tozzi, Towards the Privatization of Global Forest Governance?, 10 INT’L
FORESTRY REV. 550, 552 (2008). The 2007 UNFF talks resulted in a “Non-legally Binding
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests,” which promotes sustainable forest management
worldwide and international cooperation on global forest issues. G.A. Res. 62/98, annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/62/98, at 1, 3–4 (Jan. 31, 2008). Some claim, however, that the instrument “looks unlikely to
achieve any real consolidation of global forest governance.” Guéneau, supra, at 552.
32
The developing world has taken the position that a global forest treaty would allow the
developed world to raise trade barriers by obligating the developing world to take developmentally
detrimental action to protect tropical forests while refusing to regulate temperate and boreal forests to
the same degree. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime
Formation, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 123, 135 (2003).
33
See Deborah S. Davenport, An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of the UNCED Forest
Negotiations, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 105, 106 (2005) (noting a lack of willingness on the part of the
United States to forge an international deforestation treaty); see also Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to
Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 3 (2005) (attributing
the failure of a deforestation treaty partially to U.S. opposition). The failure of the United States to
participate is especially significant because the United States is widely considered to be the most
influential country in the global environmental governance system and U.S. participation is crucial to
the success of global environmental treaty formation. See id. at 9–13 (providing several examples of
efforts by the United States to jettison international climate talks). Even so, the United States fully
participates in only one-third of existing international environmental agreements, and refused to ratify
the current guiding climate change treaty, the Kyoto Protocol. Katrina L. Fischer, Harnessing the
Treaty Power in Support of Environmental Regulation of Activities that Don’t “Substantially Affect
Interstate Commerce”: Recognizing the Realities of the New Federalism, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 167, 199
(2004). The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005. The protocol
assigned binding carbon reduction targets and timeframes to “Annex I” industrialized nations, as well
as general commitments for all signatory nations. Levin, supra note 11, at 543–44.
34
See supra note 11.
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global treaty aimed at setting forest management standards.
With
between seventy and eighty percent of the world’s forests contained within
the boundaries of federal systems, these deficiencies need to be addressed.
Recent scholarship has identified three elements of federal systems that
facilitate the “global forest governance/decentralized forest policy”
balance: (1) national constitutional primacy over both national and
subnational forest policy; (2) national sharing of constitutional authority
over forest policy with subnational governments; and (3) forest policy
institutional enforcement capacity.36 After an introduction to these three
elements in Section II.A, Sections II.B and II.C. detail how the United
States and Canada each only maintain one element, establishing the basis
for the suggested mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism presented in
this Article.
A. Elements of Federal Constitutional Orders that Best Balance Global
Forest Governance and Decentralized Forest Policy-making
The first element, “[n]ational constitutional primacy” is the feature of a
federal system whereby the national government maintains constitutional
authority to guide national and subnational regulatory or management
standards for a resource subject to an international treaty,37 such as forests
included within a climate treaty. To be certain, this element should not
supplant decentralized forest policy-making, which clearly provides many
benefits, including: reduced central government bureaucracy, corruption,
and political meddling; more efficient decision-making; better access to
knowledge of local needs and constraints; increased information flow
between local and central governments; and greater local cooperation and
participation in governance.38 Achieving these benefits is clearly the
driving purpose behind establishing a federal form of government in the
first instance, and these results are important components of effective
resource governance on local, national, and global scales. Nonetheless,
given the increased recognition of the key role of forests in regulating
global atmospheric carbon, national constitutional primacy gives the
national government in a federal system the constitutional authority to
course-correct a trend of “over-decentralization” of forest management
35
See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 6–7) (noting that the U.S.
federal system presents challenges to decentralized forest governance systems).
36
See generally id.
37
Id. (manuscript at 23).
38
Gregersen, supra note 4, at 27–28. These benefits track the recognized benefits of federalism
generally: promoting economic growth; providing reciprocity in the enforcement of the law;
safeguarding against the potential tyranny of centralized power; encouraging local citizen participation
in governance; experimenting with new forms of governance; and providing administrative efficiency
through greater shaping of law and policy to local conditions. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the
Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1994).
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policy, whereby disaggregated local and national forest policies worldwide
fail to coordinate in a way that facilitates a holistic and consequential
climate change response. As noted by scholars, “[d]ecentralization offers
great opportunities for improved forest management, but also great
challenges. It is far from being a final solution to the ills of the forest
sector because significant possible disadvantages and dangers threaten its
potential benefits.”39 These disadvantages include interfering with the
coordination and implementation of national policies, undermining
national objectives with inconsistent local objectives, fostering
environmentally unsustainable decision-making at local levels, losing noncommercial objectives of national forest policy, and facing pressure to
extract forest resources for immediate local benefit to the detriment of
long-term national and global goods and services.40
National constitutional primacy allows the national government to
“[i]dentify which national policies should override the preferences of
decentralized bodies and establish clear rules for their enforcement at [the]
national level” and to further “[e]stablish forest management minimum
standards for decentralized institutions.”41 It also helps facilitate Fail-safe
Federalism by “strik[ing] a balance between centralized planning and
minimum standards at the federal level and decentralized implementation,
harnessing of local information and expertise, and other benefits at the
subnational level.”42 This element arises directly out of the constitutional
order of federal systems and is granted either explicitly by the federal
constitution or declared jurisprudentially as flowing from some other
national government power granted by the constitution.
The second element, national sharing of constitutional forest authority,
is present in a federal system when the national government maintains
constitutional primacy over forest policy (element 1) but seeks to achieve
the most effective management on local scales by sharing forest policy
decision-making authority with subnational governments. This element
provides a mechanism for protecting against “over-centralization” of
national forest policy. Indeed, a condition of successful forest governance
in decentralized systems is “effective and balanced distribution of forest
related responsibilities and authority among levels of government,”43
because “[c]ertain forest management decisions are better made at the
subnational, or even local levels of government, while others may best be
retained at a central level.”44 Stated differently, national sharing of forest
39

Gregersen, supra note 4, at 29.
Id. at 28.
41
Id. at 28–29.
42
Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 27).
43
Contreras-Hermosilla, supra note 10, at 7.
44
Id.
40
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authority allows the national government to perform its fail-safe role by
establishing “minimum standards” without giving rise to the myriad
problems arising from a national government micromanaging forest policy
decisions on local scales. This element is established as a political matter
and typically arises when the national government uses its legislative
authority to statutorily establish cooperative federalism arrangements with
subnational governments. Under these arrangements, subnational
governments maintain the general authority to formulate forest policy
while receiving inputs from the national level when aggregated subnational
policy fails to achieve some national objective crossing subnational
jurisdictional boundaries, such as watershed and biodiversity protection or
climate change mitigation.45
The third and final element, institutional enforcement capacity, is
necessary for a rather obvious reason—without the ability to adequately
enforce regulatory policy, even a national government that maintains
constitutional authority to direct forest policy (element 1) and to share that
authority with subnational governments (element 2) will ultimately be
ineffectual. This element reflects the notion that “forest governance is
strongly dependent on the institutional and political conditions of the
government in general.”46 Indeed, forest policy scholars note that
“[c]losing the gap between law and on-ground outcomes is one of the main
challenges in the forest sector . . . and so issues of enforcement and
compliance are amongst the most important arenas of policy analysis.”47
Many of the federal systems that maintain control over important
forest resources—especially in the developing world—maintain both
national constitutional primacy over subnational forest management
(element 1) as well as a sharing of that authority with subnational
governments (element 2). Nonetheless, these countries are plagued by
unclear constitutional divisions of power between national and subnational
governments, as well as between branches of the national government, a
great degree of corruption in government, inadequate funding or political
will for policy enforcement, and a variety of other institutional problems
that result in direct negative effects on forest policy formulation and
implementation. As demonstrated in Figure 1, Brazil, India, and Russia
fall into this category.48
45

Id.
Id. at 4.
47
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 21 (internal citation omitted).
48
The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Brazil, India, and Russia 26th, 56th, and
40th, respectively (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for the absence of corruption and 24th, 51st, and
49th, respectively (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for regulatory enforcement. MARK DAVID
AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2011 47, 66, 90 (2011)
[hereinafter WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT], available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/
files/wjproli2011_0.pdf. Brazil, India, and Russia also each have a negative score on the
46
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Australia, on the other hand, provides an example of a federal system
that maintains all three elements: Australian courts have interpreted the
constitution as allowing the federal government to trump what would
otherwise be exclusive subnational authority whenever the federal
government enters into an international treaty (element 1).49 In response,
the Australian federal government has established legislative cooperative
federalism arrangements to share that authority with subnational
governments in the area of forest management—effectively tying its own
hands to achieve the benefits of decentralized forest governance (element
2).50 Finally, Australia maintains sufficient institutional enforcement
capacity (element 3).51
As further discussed in Sections II.B and II.C, the United States and
Canada only maintain one of these elements—institutional enforcement
capacity—giving rise to the suggested fail-safe mechanisms presented in
Part IV.

Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index. MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 43 fig.2.5. The
Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index, which was developed by Yale and Columbia Universities,
“integrates assessment of the stringency of the environmental pollution standards, the sophistication of
regulatory structure, the quality of available environmental information, the extent of subsidization of
natural resources, the strictness of enforcement, and the quality of environmental institutions.” Id. at
43–44.
49
See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34) (citing Commonwealth v.
Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.), and Marcus B. Lane, Regional Forest Agreements: Resolving
Resource Conflicts or Managing Resource Politics?, 37 AUSTL. GEOGRAPHICAL STUD. 142, 144
(1999)).
50
See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34–39).
51
The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Australia 9th (out of sixty-six countries
assessed) for the absence of corruption and 7th (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for regulatory
enforcement. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 48, at 42. Australia also has a positive score on
the Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia Universities. See
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 43 fig.2.5.

940

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:925

Figure 1.

B. Status of Elements in the United States
The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit constitutional authority for
either the federal government or the states to regulate the sixty-five percent
of U.S. forests in either private or state ownership. As a result, subnational
forest management regulation is a role reserved for the state governments
under the Constitution, undertaken pursuant to state and local authority to
regulate land use. State governments have long maintained the primary
responsibility of regulating land use under their authority to exercise the
“police power” to protect the “general welfare.”52 The Tenth Amendment,
which reserves powers not constitutionally granted to the federal
government for the states, places limits on Congress’s regulatory authority

52
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 646–47 (1887) (stating that under the Constitution a state
may only restrain a use of private property through exercise of its police power, and determining that a
proper exercise of a state’s police power is that which “is necessary and reasonable for guarding against
the evil which injures or threatens the [general] welfare in the given case . . . .”).
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“in traditional areas of state and local authority, such as land use,” and
“[l]and use law has always been a creature of state and local law.”54 The
U.S. Supreme Court solidified this constitutional role for the states in the
seminal land-use regulatory case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,55 which has
been described as a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regulation
over private property.”56 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court itself has
recognized “the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”57
and that “[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local
58
power.” In the context of subnational forest management, scholars have
recognized that “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government has
limited authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the
states. Forestland management and use was one such reserved power.”59
Thus, under current understandings of U.S. constitutional law, the U.S.
federal government does not maintain national constitutional primacy over
subnational forest policy (element 1) and therefore cannot share any such
authority with subnational governments via cooperative federalism
arrangements (element 2).60
53

53
James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection, in THE
EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F.
Bates eds., 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Other scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of
legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the United States] leaves the states in
charge of regulating how private land is used.” JOHN R. NOLON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008).
54
Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003).
55
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
56
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE AND
CONSERVATION 967 (2006).
57
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)
(citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a
function traditionally performed by local governments.”)).
58
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added); see also FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential
state activity.”) (emphasis added). For a more general discussion distinguishing permissible, tangential
influencing effects of U.S. federal statutes on state regulation of forests from arguably impermissible
federal interference with state constitutional authority over forest management, see Hudson &
Weinthal, supra note 2, at 405–13.
59
Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the U.S., in THE POLITICS OF
DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 4, at 238, 239; see also JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW 849 (2006) (“The laws related to timber management vary depending on whether it takes place on
private, state, tribal, or federal lands . . . [s]tate timber laws regulate the forestry industry by requiring
practices designed to minimize water pollution, soil erosion, and fire dangers, and by encouraging or
requiring deforestation.”). Despite maintaining the regulatory authority to do so, most states do not
place legally binding forest management standards upon private forest managers. As noted by scholars,
“[a]lthough a few states have laws that regulate forest practices on private land, most rely upon
voluntary best management practices and technical assistance.” Rose, supra, at 238 (emphasis added).
60
As discussed below in Section IV.A.2.i, however, cooperative federalism arrangements can be
established in the opposite direction—that is, the federal government can entice the states, via
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Even so, there are two means by which the U.S. federal government
could attempt to exert constitutional authority over subnational forest
management. First, Congress could attempt to pass domestic legislation
asserting direct control over subnational forest management under one of
its other enumerated powers, such as the Commerce Clause. To date, this
route has not been taken by the federal government, and U.S. courts have
not had an opportunity to assess the constitutionality of federal private
forest legislation. Second, notwithstanding Commerce Clause authority,
the United States might enter into a legally binding international treaty
requiring Congress to pass implementing legislation mandating that certain
forest management directives be carried out on subnationally-owned
forests. In such a circumstance, would the federal government’s treaty
power trump the states’ reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to
regulate subnational forest management? Currently, U.S. constitutional
law scholars are in heated disagreement as to whether the treaty power
established in Article II of the Constitution61 may be constrained by
constitutional federalism principles.62
In one camp are “new
federalist[s],”63 who assert that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions64
place federalism restraints on the United States’ ability to implement
international treaties requiring the passage of congressional legislation that
would be unconstitutional if enacted in the absence of a treaty, such as
legislation intruding into regulatory areas traditionally reserved for the
states under the Constitution.65 On the other side of the debate are
legislation or other means, to relinquish state authority over forest management to allow federal inputs
into subnational forest regulatory policy.
61
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
62
For a thorough discussion of this disagreement and its implications, see Hudson, Climate
Change, supra note 2, at Section III.A.
63
See Swaine, supra note 23, at 408 & n.15.
64
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (invalidating a federal domestic
violence statute on the grounds that it is not a proper exercise of the Commerce Clause, stating
“[i]ndeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and the
vindication of its victims”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding federal statute
that imposed obligation to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchases
unconstitutional in accordance with traditional federalism principles); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeds Congress’
power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free Schools Zones
Act of 1990 unconstitutional because gun possession in a school zone “neither regulates a commercial
activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution protects us
from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one locations as an expedient
solution to the crisis of the day.”).
65
See Bradley, supra note 23, at 132 (“[The] nationalist view . . . conflict[s] with the limited and
enumerated powers structure of the Constitution.”); Bradley, supra note 3, at 394 (“[I]f federalism is to
be the subject of judicial protection . . . there is no justification for giving the treaty power special
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“nationalists,” who assert that domestic legislation implemented pursuant
to an international treaty allows the national government to maintain
regulatory authority even over matters traditionally regulated by state
governments and that would otherwise be outside the scope of federal
constitutional authority in the absence of a treaty.66
Ultimately, though the new federalist/nationalist debate is driven by
divergent theories of constitutional interpretation, the issue is not settled
largely due to the narrow fact pattern and unclear reasoning of the seminal
U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the scope of the treaty power,
Missouri v. Holland,67 decided in 1920. In Holland, the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress could pass implementing legislation (the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act) pursuant to a treaty with Canada, despite a challenge by
the state of Missouri that the Act was unconstitutional because it interfered
with the states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment.68 Missouri
argued that the statute was impermissible in part because states
traditionally controlled the management of wildlife resources.69 The
Court’s ruling ultimately turned on the fact that the birds were migratory
(crossing international boundaries) and that the important national interest
could be adequately managed “only by national action in concert with that
of another power.”70
The narrow fact pattern presented in Holland, however, is arguably
distinguishable from federal regulation of subnational forest management.
Not only has subnational forest management traditionally been considered
a land use activity subject to the exclusive regulatory authority of state

immunity from such protection.”); Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist
Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1329–31, 1333 (2006) (contrasting the
ideologies of the “nationalists” to the “new Federalists”); Fischer, supra note 33, at 176 (proposing a
framework for the application of federal treaty power that is limited enough to ameliorate federalism
concerns); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1869–
70, 1875 (2005) (analyzing Missouri v. Holland and concluding that “[t]reaties can not expand the
legislative power of Congress”); Swaine, supra note 23, at 406–08 (arguing recent Supreme Court
decisions classified a doctrinal resurgence known as “new federalism” placed the United States at risk
for violating its international treaties).
66
See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1313–15 (2000) (concluding that
the “text, structure, precedent, and history” of our “constitutional argument” lends “overwhelming
support” for the nationalist view); see also Hollis, supra note 65, at 1330–31 (outlining the ideologies
of the “nationalists,” and summarizing: “[n]ationalists thus reject the idea that federalism imposes
subject matter limitations on the conclusion or implementation of treaties, even for subjects Congress
could not otherwise regulate in the treaty’s absence”).
67
252 U.S. 416 (1920). Missouri v. Holland has been described as “perhaps the most famous and
most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs.” LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 190 (2d ed. 1996).
68
Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31, 434–35.
69
Id. at 430–31.
70
Id. at 435.
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governments, similar to zoning standards, but unlike wildlife forests are
owned by identifiable parties, are not a migratory resource, and are not
“protected only by national action in concert with that of another power.”72
In fact, numerous constitutional scholars have argued that Holland, at the
least, should be limited to its facts, is not in line with the nationalist view,
and should be construed narrowly,73 and at the most, should be overruled.74
Ultimately, under current understandings of U.S. constitutional law the
federal government may be legally constrained from effectively entering
into and implementing an international climate treaty that seeks a certain
degree of control over forest management activities75 because nearly twothirds of U.S. forests are subject to subnational regulatory authority.76 This
presents a “legal” constraint because even if the national government
politically chose to act, it would only take one private property owner or
71

Rose, supra note 59, at 239.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). While this may be true, harnessing the full
potential of forests to mitigate climate change certainly seems like a result that can only be achieved by
national action in concert with other governments.
73
See Swaine, supra note 23, at 412 (“While Missouri v. Holland may survive for the foreseeable
future, it will likely be read narrowly.”); see also Bradley, supra note 3, at 459 (observing that a brief
filed by the Clinton administration gives support to the conclusion that the Holland decision would be
read much more narrowly today); Fischer, supra note 33, at 181 (finding arguments that Missouri v.
Holland’s holding is still good law unpersuasive in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and the
modern context of international law-making).
74
See Rosenkranz, supra note 65, at 1937 (“Missouri v. Holland may be canonical, but it does not
present a strong case for the application of stare decisis. It is wrongly decided, and it should be
overruled.”).
75
An example would be if the United States signed and ratified an international treaty requiring
Congress to pass domestic legislation establishing nation-wide forest management standards on
publicly and privately owned forest lands. Such standards might take the form of maintenance of
partial forest cover on forested lands (a prohibition on clear-cutting), implementation of soil erosion
reduction programs, establishment of nationwide riparian buffer zones in forested watersheds, or
limitation of fertilizer use. In fact, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has stated that
international agreements on forests could ensure the implementation of
72

[f]orest management activities to increase stand-level forest carbon stocks[,]
[which] include harvest systems that maintain partial forest cover, minimize
losses of dead organic matter (including slash) or soil carbon by reducing soil
erosion, and by avoiding slash burning and other high-emission activities.
Planting after harvest or natural disturbances accelerates tree growth and reduces
carbon losses relative to natural regeneration. Economic considerations are
typically the main constraint, because retaining additional carbon on site delays
revenues from harvest. The potential benefits of carbon sequestration can be
diminished where increased use of fertilizer causes greater N2O emissions.
Gert J. Nabuurs & Omar Masera et al., 9: Forestry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 549 (Bert Mertz et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm (follow “Chapter 9: Forestry” hyperlink).
76
For a broader discussion on the tension between U.S. federalism and international law and
treaty obligations, see Hudson, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 355–59.
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one state government combined with the right mix of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices to have national action blocked by a constitutional challenge.
Furthermore, as described above, legal perception is often political reality
in the United States, and the United States has invoked federalism
limitations in past treaty negotiations on a number of subjects in an effort
to avoid global agreements restricting traditional state regulatory
authority.77 Without national constitutional primacy (element 1), and
national sharing of forest policy authority (element 2), the only element of
the global forest governance/decentralized forest policy balance that the
U.S. maintains is institutional enforcement capacity (element 3).78
The United States is not the only federal system potentially constrained
by subnational governments during international climate negotiations.
Edward Swaine has noted that “[f]ederal states not infrequently seek
broader concessions based on the political feasibility of national
implementation, but the arguments that have had purchase are based on
more genuine constitutional limits. Much the same may be said with
respect to . . . outright refusals to participate based on federalism
grounds.”79 Recent research suggests that Canada also maintains only one
of the three elements that best facilitate the global forest
governance/decentralized forest policy balance.80 As discussed in the next
section, Canada’s federal government is more restricted by the provinces
during global governance efforts than the U.S. federal government is by
the states.
C. Status of Elements in Canada
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867
explicitly allocates forest management regulatory authority between the
federal government and the provinces.81
Section 92A delegates
responsibility for non-federally owned forest regulation and overall
management exclusively to the provincial governments.82 In other words,
the Canadian Constitution does not allow concurrent jurisdiction over
77

See supra note 23.
The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates the U.S. 17th (out of sixty-six countries
assessed) for the absence of corruption and 15th (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for regulatory
enforcement. World Justice Project, supra note 48, at 103. The U.S. also has a positive score on the
Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia Universities.
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 43.
79
Swaine, supra note 23, at 445–46; see also Hollis, supra note 65, at 1327–1328 (discussing the
dual nature of treaties as creatures subject to substantive and procedural rules of both international law
and national law).
80
See generally, Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2.
81
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), §§ 92–92A, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app.
II, no. 5 (Can.).
82
Id. § 92A.
78
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83

forests, as do the constitutions of many other federal systems.84 This
explicit grant of authority has significant implications for Canada’s ability
to both maintain a national forest policy, and to negotiate an international
climate treaty that includes forests, because eighty-four percent of
Canada’s forests are non-federally owned (seven percent are privately
owned and seventy-seven percent are provincially owned).85 This is an
even higher proportion of forests under subnational control than in the
United States, where state governments are responsible for regulating the
sixty percent of forests that are privately owned and the five percent of
forests that are state-owned.86
Passage of Section 92 of the Constitution Act of 1982 reinforced
provincial authority over subnational forest management by declaring that
provinces maintain exclusive control over property rights.87 Canadian
courts have broadly construed this constitutional provision to include land
use and natural resources management.88 These amendments to Canada’s
Constitution place it “beyond dispute that the provinces are primarily
responsible for forest management.”89 As a result, Canadian forest policy
is “extremely decentralized,” with national authority over forests being
“particularly weak.”90 Even the national government itself has come to
eschew attempts to form a national policy on forest management, declaring
that “‘[f]orest management is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Each
province and territory has its own set of legislation, policies and
regulations to govern the management of its forests.’”91 Indeed, the
Canadian national government has consistently refused to apply national
environmental laws, forest policies, or international forest management
agreements to the provinces.92
Despite explicit provincial constitutional authority over forest
83
Paul Stanton Kibel, Canada’s International Forest Protection Obligations: A Case of Promises
Forgotten in British Columbia and Alberta, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 247 (1995).
84
See generally Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (undertaking a comparative
constitutional analysis of five federal systems: Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia).
85
Sustainable, supra note 26, at 4.
86
U.N. ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 3, supra note 21, at
110.
87
Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), § 92(13), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 44 (Can.).
88
Kibel, supra note 83, at 247.
89
DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 133 (2003). Under the Canadian Constitution, however, the federal government does retain the
role of participating in international negotiations “related to the conservation and use of forests.” Id. at
132.
90
Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, Globalization and Governance Capacity: Explaining
Divergence in National Forest Programs as Instances of “Next-Generation” Regulation in Canada
and Europe, 19 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 251, 265 (2006).
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Kibel, supra note 83, at 246 (quoting CANADIAN FOREST SERV., THE STATE OF CANADA’S
FORESTS 1993 8 (1994)).
92
Kibel, supra note 83, at 246.
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management, Section 91 of the Canadian Constitution does grant the
national government exclusive authority over “trade and commerce” as
well as “peace, order, and good government.”93 The Canadian Supreme
Court has construed this provision as including the implementation of
treaties concerning trade and commerce and other matters of “national
concern.”94 Certainly climate change would seem to affect both commerce
and trade in Canadian forest products, and it is clearly a matter of national
and global concern. Yet, the Canadian national government has not
attempted to invoke this constitutional power to justify the implementation
of international climate and forest agreements, and “[t]he Canadian federal
government has so far adopted the position that, under the Canadian
Constitution, its hands are tied.”95 Indeed, scholars have noted that the
“ambiguous nature of the federal role in . . . forest policy” formation has
resulted in “a variety of idiosyncratic organizational” mechanisms geared
toward greater federal input into Canadian forest policy, and “[t]he need
for governments at both levels [to maintain] greater administrative capacity
in order to better coordinate increasingly sophisticated policy regimes . . .
[as is] evident in efforts made at the intergovernmental level to develop
more effective forest policy structures.”96 This is especially so since
Canada has been “aggressive” in signing on to various international treaties
related to forest management, including climate change, even though
“implementation remains the responsibility of the provinces.”97 As a
result, scholars have recognized “the need for greater coordination of these
increasingly sophisticated policy regimes”98 or Canada’s forest practices
will continue to come under international scrutiny. Similarly, scholars
have recognized that Canada must play a role in shaping international
relations on forests by “vigorously participat[ing] and be[ing] proactive in
international discussions.”99
Despite the Canadian national government’s desire to act
“aggressively” regarding international environmental agreements, the
Canadian provinces’ exclusive control over direct forest management has
in the past contributed to Canada’s lack of formal participation in a variety
93

Id. at 248.
Id.
95
Id.
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Michael Howlett, Introduction: Policy Regimes and Policy Change in the Canadian Forest
Sector, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY 3, 11 (Michael Howlett ed., 2001).
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Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, The Business and Government Nexus: Principal Elements
and Dynamics of the Canadian Forest Policy Regime, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY, supra note 96, at
23, 36–37.
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Id. at 37.
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Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, The International-Domestic Nexus: The Effects of
International Trade and Environmental Politics on the Canadian Forest Sector, in CANADIAN FOREST
POLICY, supra note 96, at 65, 85.
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of international agreements
and has resulted in “constant tensions
between the provinces and the federal government over sharing of power”
over forests.101 It appears that the presence of explicit constitutional
provisions regarding forests actually causes federalism to be far more of a
problem in the forest context than in the context of other types of resource
management, such as fisheries and agriculture. In those areas, the federal
and provincial governments have resolved management conflicts with
“cooperative federalism” arrangements, whereby political and fiscal
pressures by the national government achieved provincial compliance with
national policy102—an approach that might better be called uncooperative
federalism. These results have yet to be achieved regarding forest
management, even though scholars have argued that similar avenues exist
for greater federal involvement in non-federal forest policy.103
Ultimately, the lack of national constitutional primacy (element 1)
adversely impacts not only the Canadian federal government’s ability to
formulate a national forest policy, but also the interplay between Canadian
federalism and international agreements concerning forests, since the
Canadian national government is constrained by provincially reserved
powers in exercising its treaty power.104 Limitations on the Canadian
treaty power became Canadian constitutional precedent in the Labor
Conventions case,105 where the Privy Council established that the Canadian
federal government does not have the authority to implement treaties via
enacting legislation that interferes with matters constitutionally reserved to
the provinces. In other words, “in Canada, the federal government lacks
legislative competence to implement treaties whose subject matter falls
within provincial jurisdiction”106—a constitutional state of affairs similar to
the situation in the United States, if not more problematic. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s narrow ruling in Missouri v. Holland did not give such
definitive treatment to the question of the relationship between the treaty
power and federalism principles,107 and it remains to be seen whether the
U.S. Congress has the power, pursuant to an international treaty, to intrude
upon the regulatory role of the states over subnational forest policy.
100
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The explicit constitutional grant of regulatory authority over forests to
the provinces, coupled with the fact that Canadian courts have definitively
declared the treaty power to be restricted by reserved provincial powers,
makes it clear that Canada is currently even more restricted in international
negotiations regarding forests than the United States. Indeed, “[w]hile the
United States Constitution actually contemplates a system that values the
importance of the nation’s being able to implement its treaties, the
Canadian constitutional framework appears to subordinate international
concerns to domestic separation of legislative competence.”108
Furthermore, and unlike U.S. courts, “Canadian courts have consistently
extended rather than diminished provincial power.”109
This review demonstrates that the Canadian national government,
though maintaining institutional enforcement capacity (element 3) as a
general matter,110 currently does not maintain constitutional primacy over
forest management (element 1). As a result, the government necessarily
cannot maintain any resulting national sharing of constitutional forest
policy authority (element 2). Thus, subnational constitutional primacy
over forests, combined with the vast subnational ownership of forests,
constrains the national government from utilizing certain forms of global
forest governance to address climate change—a constraint equal to, if not
greater than, that placed on the U.S. federal government by the states.
Ultimately, the U.S. and Canadian federal systems’ lack of the
necessary elements required to fully balance global governance of forests
with effective decentralized forest policy must be addressed. Mechanisms
for doing so are discussed in Part IV. First, however, Part III explains that
even though the U.S. and Canadian brands of federalism impact global
governance of forests in similar ways, their respective subnationallyestablished domestic forest policy frameworks are quite different—a
difference driven largely by the fact that subnational governments own a
vast majority of forests in Canada, whereas private property owners
maintain control over a majority of forests in the United States. These
differences, combined with the distinct constitutional structure of each
country in the context of forest policy, give rise to contrasting
recommended approaches in Part IV for forging Fail-safe Federalism in the
event that subnational governments do not address the increasing threats to
domestic forests and the international community seeks to aggressively
108
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The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Canada 11th (out of sixty-six countries
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harness domestic forestry to combat climate change via a legally binding
international treaty.
III. U.S. AND CANADIAN DOMESTIC FOREST GOVERNANCE: DIVERGENT
APPROACHES, DISPARATE IMPLICATIONS FOR FAIL-SAFE FEDERALISM
Both the U.S. and Canadian national governments are constrained by
subnational governments from entering into certain types of legally
binding treaties aimed at harnessing the capacity of forests to regulate
climate change. Even so, each country’s domestic forest governance
structure gives rise to important differences, which should be analyzed to
provide a vector for the most appropriate constitutional methods of forging
national-level fail-safes for forest management.
As demonstrated in this Part, the main driver of these differences is the
fact that a vast majority of Canada’s forests are provincially owned
(seventy-seven percent)—in stark contrast to the sixty percent of U.S.
forests that are privately owned.111 As a result, Canada’s subnational
governments tend to maintain forest management standards that are both
more consistent across the nation and more rigorous in setting minimum
standards for a variety of forest management policies. The provinces also
seem to respond more readily to external demands for heightened forest
management standards, such as those raised by environmental, scientific,
or other members of civil society, than do U.S. state governments. This is
likely due to the fact that a government will more readily respond to the
demands of civil society regarding the management of its own lands than
the management of private lands. In addition, the provincial electorate’s
constituent members have no legally vested private property rights in
public forestlands. Rather, their interests are likely to be focused on the
benefits that forests can provide the subnational government’s citizenry as
a whole. In the United States, on the other hand, where sixty percent of
forests are privately owned, a higher proportion of civil society is made up
of the very private forest owners who would be regulated, and who are,
therefore, more resistant to government interference.
Ultimately,
provincial governments are simply freer to adjust the management of their
own policies in response to the electorate’s demands than are state
governments in the United States. As explained below, it is true that the
provinces may face countervailing pressure from the forest industry, but
provincial interaction with the “one face” of this relatively unified industry
is a different matter altogether from U.S. state governments, who interact
with innumerable private property owners, any one of whom may
constitutionally challenge regulatory action as infringing on private
property rights.
111

CAN. COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, supra note 26, at 4.
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Despite the more responsive nature of provincial forest management,
however, it remains that the Canadian federal government is more
constitutionally restricted from asserting any measure of authority over
forest management than is the U.S. federal government.112 This state of
affairs creates a curious scenario in Canada, where—from a strictly
domestic perspective—constitutional prescriptive (and even sometimes
cooperative) national involvement in forest policy is exceedingly difficult
to achieve, but it may also be less necessary from an environmental
protection standpoint. Canadian subnational domestic forest policy, at
least from a statutory point of view, is simply more rigorous and of a
higher quality across the board than that of U.S. subnational governments.
This assertion is made from a strictly domestic perspective, because if the
international community seeks robust mechanisms to utilize forests as
carbon sinks to regulate carbon via a legally binding treaty, then a “good”
Canadian forest policy today may not be viewed as “good” tomorrow. In
other words, Canadian forests may currently be subject to strong,
fundamental forest management standards such as protecting riparian
watersheds, limiting clear-cut sizes, or regulating the number and extent of
roads built during foresting operations, but if the goal is to keep fewer trees
from hitting the ground, then the Canadian national government remains
limited in institutional capacity to formulate such a policy consistent with
the needs and requirements of the global community. Correspondingly,
while U.S. subnational forest standards may not be as robust, the U.S.
Constitution appears to allow more opportunity for the U.S. federal
government to achieve inputs into subnational policy, whether those inputs
are prescriptive or cooperative in nature. So an understanding of U.S. and
Canadian domestic forest policies provides insights into the most
appropriate methods of forging Fail-safe Federalism to facilitate global
climate governance related to forests, discussed in Part IV.
A. Framework for Assessing U.S. and Canadian Domestic Forest Policies
In the first comprehensive study of its kind, McDermott et al. provided
a framework for assessing and comparing the domestic forest policies of
governments around the globe,113 identifying four “styles” of forest policy
regulation. The first is “procedural voluntary,” which, as the name
suggests, encourages the voluntary development of forest management
processes or plans, but does not require such plans to be developed.114
These are contrasted with “procedural mandatory” rules, which require the
112

See infra notes 250–264 and accompanying text.
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development of forest management plans or procedures, much as the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires environmental
assessment reports for agency projects.115
Third are “substantive
voluntary” policies, where specific forest practice guidelines exist, but they
are not binding on forest managers.116 Finally “substantive prescriptive”
rules “refer[] to mandatory, on-the-ground requirements or restrictions,
such as a rule that no timber harvest may occur within x metres of a river
of y width.”117 Substantive prescriptive rules are, of course, enforceable at
law.
McDermott et al. assessed domestic forest governance policies to
determine which of these “styles” of forest policy regulation different
governments maintain regarding five types of environmental protection for
forests. For each type of protection, the authors assigned an “indicator”
used to classify the policy approach as one of the above “styles” of
regulation. The types of protection and associated indicators are as
follows:
1) Protection of riparian zones in forested watersheds
(indicator: riparian streamside buffer zone rules)
2) Protection from environmental damage caused by
roads (indicator: rules for culvert size at stream
crossings and road decommissioning)
3) Protection from clearcutting damage (indicator:
clearcut size limits or other relevant cutting rules)
4) Reforestation (indicator: requirements for
reforestation, including specified time frames and
stocking levels)
5) Limitations on annual allowable cut (indicator: cut
limits based on sustained yield)118
In addition to these five metrics, a variety of additional environmental
protection metrics can be assessed to determine whether forests are
managed sustainably. The most holistic forest management approaches
take into account metrics beyond those that maximize timber harvest and
may include the protection of biodiversity, species habitat, ecosystems,
115
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118
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genetic resources, and recreational and cultural values, as well as the
provision of water purification, flood prevention, and air quality regulation
services.119 The five metrics used by McDermott et al., however, are
fundamental and reflect a baseline upon which good silvicultural practices
may build and expand.
Protecting riparian zones in forested watersheds prevents erosion that
might otherwise take timberland out of production, prevents siltation of
waterways that can lead to eutrophication, provides wildlife corridors,
regulates water temperatures, protects aquatic habitat, and provides a
variety of other benefits.120 Road building is “one of the ‘main causes [of]
the environmental degradation of most forest regions.’”121 Roads degrade
forests because they provide greater access for resource extraction (or
over-extraction), cause erosion that damages watersheds, and fragment
forested landscapes and habitat.122 As a result, decommissioning roads or
limiting their location or extent is an important sustainable forest
management objective. Clearcutting practices can also be highly damaging
to the environment and are “perhaps the most controversial forest
harvesting practice[s]”—criticized by ecologists, civil society, and forest
market scholars alike.123 Clearcutting is effectively a complete removal
and replacement of the forest. Though subsequent reforestation normally
occurs, the removal of so much stored carbon, as well as the carbon
sequestering potential of larger trees, has serious consequences for
regulating greenhouse gases—not to mention the complete destruction of a
variety of other ecological processes and habitats.124 Finally, reforestation
and annual allowable cut policies are aimed at ensuring that no more of the
resource is being harvested than is sustainable.125
As can be seen in the McDermott et al. table, “Summary of
jurisdictional approaches to all five forest practice criteria”126 (below),
there are dramatic differences between the “styles” of riparian buffer zone,
119
See JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 1206–09 (2d ed. 2009);
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CHANGE—A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 15, 16–20 (Risto Seppälä et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://www.iufro.org/science/gfep/embargoed-release/download-by-chapter/
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“Download
chapter 1” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
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road, clearcut, reforestation, and annual allowable cut forest policies
applied by the Canadian provinces and those applied by the U.S. states.
The chart reflects the styles of “mandatory substantive”127 in black,
“mandatory procedural” in gray, and where the two types of mandatory are
both used in some capacity, the chart depicts “mandatory mixed” in grid
form. Both styles of voluntary are represented by horizontal lines, while
the “no policy” category is blank (white). Different governments are
ranked based on an average of the “style” utilized for each of the five
indicators, with mandatory approaches landing governments nearer to “10”
on the scale (with mandatory substantive the most stringent) and voluntary
or no policy landing governments nearer to “0.”
The Canadian provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and New
Brunswick, the U.S. state of California, and the U.S. Forest Service (which
manages federally owned forests) each score a “9” on the scale,
maintaining very high forest policy standards.128 The Canadian provinces
of Ontario and Quebec and the U.S. state of Washington score a high “8”
on the scale.129 The U.S. state of Oregon scores a “7” while Idaho scores a
“5,” and Alaska scores a “4.”130 Lowest on the scale are the states of
Montana with a “2.5,” Louisiana and Virginia with a “2,” and the rest of
the southeastern United States—Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas with a score of “1.”131 To put
the southeastern U.S. states’ legal standards for forest policy in
perspective, consider that developing countries average a “6.7” on the scale
while nine southeastern U.S. states average a “1.2,” maintaining entirely
voluntary “guidelines” or no standards at all.132

Id. The chart misidentifies “mandatory substantive” as “mandatory prescriptive” in the key.
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As these rankings indicate, Canadian provinces maintain far higher and
more consistent standards across the board than do U.S. states. While
some U.S. states maintain high forest management standards, others,
particularly in the Southeast, maintain no enforceable standards at all.133
133
Id. at 327 tbl.10.7. These lax standards have implications for other resources beyond forests
and fail to facilitate the protection of forest habitat critical to species protection. Indeed, there is a
sharp contrast between the regulatory standards for forests in the Southeast and the high amount of
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The implications of these lax standards in the southeastern United States
for domestic forest health are profound and provide just one of the many
compelling justifications for forging Fail-safe Federalism, not only to
facilitate the international community’s efforts to utilize forests to mitigate
the effects of climate change, but also for the benefit of domestic forests.
For example, the U.S. Forest Service’s Southern Forests Futures
Project (Futures Project)134 highlighted in dramatic fashion the pressure
that southeastern U.S. forests will face over the next fifty years. The
project specifically focused on four factors that would “define the South’s
future forests.135 These factors include: population growth, climate
change,136 timber markets, and invasive species.137
In particular,
“[u]rbanization is forecasted to result in forest losses, increased carbon
emissions, and stress to other forest resources.”138 Conversion of forests to
urban and other land uses is also expected to degrade a variety of water
ecosystem services, including flood control and water filtration—even to
the point of threatening public health.139 Population growth in the
Southeast would “result[] in declines in forest cover, increases in demand
for ecosystem service[s], and restrictions that complicate the ability to
biodiversity in the region. Id. at 90. Alabama, for example—the state that “[avoids] environmental
problems through voluntary application of preventative techniques,” id. at 82—also happens to have
the third highest number of listed threatened or endangered species under the ESA of any state in the
U.S., only trailing Hawaii and California, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, SPECIES REPORTS,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/stateListingAndOccurrence.jsp (last updated October 17, 2011);
see also MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 94 fig.3.5 (showing number of endangered and threatened
animal species in Canadian provinces and U.S. states).
134
Wear, supra note 24, at 4. The report studied thirteen states, including: Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. Id. at 4 fig.1.
135
Id.
136
Average annual temperatures are expected to increase in the region 2.5 to 3.5 degrees Celsius
by 2060. Id. at 27.
137
Id. at 4.
138
Id. Since the 1970s total forest area has been stable, but this stability is a result of agricultural
lands being reforested at the same rate that urbanization has reduced forest cover. Id. at 15. While
urbanization is expected to increase at even higher rates, conversion of agricultural lands to forests is
not expected to continue. Id. at 31.
139
The report notes that:
Strong population growth and associated urbanization has increased demand for
water and challenged water availability in several areas . . . . Conversion of
forests to urban and other land uses has resulted in a loss of natural buffering,
increasing water pollution loads, elevating peak flows, and reducing base flows
in affected watersheds. The consequences are more frequent and more severe
flooding, lower stream flows during drought conditions, and water quality that is
degraded—sometimes to the point of threatening public health. . . . [T]he link
between conversion of forest land to urban uses and degraded water quality in
affected watersheds is well accepted.
Wear, supra note 24, at 24.
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manage forests for the full spectrum of uses.”
Both population and
economic growth have increased at higher rates in the Southeast than
anywhere else in the United States, “with the resulting urbanization
steadily consuming forests and other rural lands.”141 The Futures Project
estimates that thirty to forty-three million acres of southern land will
succumb to urban development by 2060, with total forest losses projected
to be as high as twenty-three million acres, or approximately thirteen
percent of all forestland in the south142—an amount equal to nearly all the
forest acreage in the states of Georgia or Alabama.143 The negative
impacts of these forecasts go beyond pure environmental concerns, as the
timber production sector in the South contributed more than one million
jobs and fifty-one billion dollars in employee compensation in 2009.144
Indeed, “southern forests are the most intensively managed forests in the
U.S.,”145 and a majority of the United States’ lumber is harvested from
southern forests.146 Remarkably, “since 1986, if the South were compared
with any other country, none would produce more timber than this one
region of the United States.”147
As noted above, in the context of climate change, urbanization of the
south is expected to have direct negative impacts on the carbon storage
capacity of southern forests.148 The amount of carbon fixed in southern
forests and their soils is projected to reach a maximum in 2020,149 and then
decline by as much as five percent by 2060.150 This “potential decline in
carbon storage would be a challenge for carbon mitigation policies,
presenting a dynamic baseline where a first order policy objective would
be to stabilize rather than expand forest carbon stocks.”151 In other words,
even if climate change mitigation policies related to forest management
could be enacted by subnational governments, they would not only be
unable to sequester additional amounts of carbon to combat climate
140
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change, but it would be exceedingly difficult to prevent forest carbon
stocks from dropping even further. Furthermore, given the completely
voluntary nature of most southern forest management standards—
standards that should be completely fundamental to good forestry
practices—it is hard to imagine prescriptive climate mitigation policies
even being put into place by southeastern states in the near future, much
less being successful. The success of such policies would be undermined
because countervailing land use policies facilitating rapid urbanization are
also widespread.152
The low forest management standards found in southeastern states
arise directly out of the current lack of national constitutional authority to
coordinate subnational forest policy, in conjunction with the southeastern
United States’ governance philosophy regarding forests and land use and
the high amount of forests privately owned in the Southeast. Alabama’s
perspective on voluntary “best management practices” is emblematic of
this governance philosophy.153 As McDermott et al. have recently
highlighted, the Alabama Forestry Commission declares that it is the “lead
agency for forestry in Alabama” but that it is “not an environmental
regulatory or enforcement agency” and that it “[avoids] environmental
problems through voluntary application of preventative techniques.”154
Yet when given the choice between preserving a forest, or managing it for
the full range of ecological values, and cutting it down in the name of
economic development and urbanization, voluntary choices do not lead to
“preventative techniques” that benefit forests, as evidenced by rapid urban
sprawl in the southeastern United States and the Forest Service’s projected
loss of up to thirteen percent of the region’s forests over the next fifty
years.155 Even so, most administrative agencies in the region operate
similarly, as “[t]he implementation of BMPs [Best Management
Practices] . . . generally involves agencies not directly responsible for
environmental regulation.”156
In short, the case of southeastern U.S. forest policy demonstrates the
dramatic differences between U.S. and Canadian domestic legal standards
for forest management, as well as the implications for failing to achieve
greater federal inputs into subnational forest policy via Fail-safe
Federalism. The next section provides hypotheses aimed at explaining the
differences between U.S. and Canadian forest policy, providing a
foundation for Part IV’s exploration of how the nuances in federal
structure and forest ownership in the United States and Canada give rise to
152
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different suggested mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism that
strengthens not only domestic forest policy but also the ability of the
international community to effectively utilize binding treaties to combat
climate change.
B. Explaining the United States-Canada Forest Policy Gap: Private vs.
Public Forest Ownership
Ultimately, the gap between Canadian provincial forest policy—the
uniformity of which somewhat approximates a national forest policy
(though one driven solely by subnational interests)—and the widely
divergent forest policies of the U.S. states is in large part explained by the
respective splits in forest ownership in the two countries. As described
below, in Canada the vast majority of forests are provincially owned,
which facilitates greater uniformity, stringency, and adaptability of
Canadian provincial forest policy. In contrast, the majority private
ownership of U.S. forests thwarts uniformity across, as well as stringency
and adaptability among, U.S. states. A variety of domestic governance
nuances arise out of the private versus public forest ownership split in the
United States and Canada, driving distinctions in subnational forest policy
in the respective nations. For example, the nature of forest industry
leaseholds in Canada is a key driver of the uniformity across provincial
jurisdictions. In addition, a more stable regulatory environment in Canada,
as well as a public forest management “spillover effect” in the western
United States not seen in eastern states, each feed into the stringency of
subnational forest policy in the two countries, as well as into the
adaptability of subnational governments to respond to needed changes in
forest policy.
1. A Formula for Uniformity: The Canadian PrivateIndustry/Provincial Interface as Quasi-corporatist Negotiations
The relative uniformity of high forest policy standards across
subnational governments in Canada is a result of a fairly basic formula—a
handful of provincial governments are negotiating with a relatively
uniform industrial base for the management and extraction of forest
resources. The Canadian forest sector is governed by eleven major
provincial jurisdictions and historically has been Canada’s largest industry
and employer.157 Due to seventy-seven percent of Canadian forests being
owned by the provinces, scholars describe the current Canadian forest
policy regime as one of “public forest management for private timber
harvesting.”158 The Canadian provinces allocate harvesting rights on
157
158
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government-owned forests through large-scale, long-term licenses.159
These licenses require the development of management plans that “align
with strategic regional land use plans overseen by the province.”160
Even though Canadian forest policy is extremely decentralized with
complete, independent control maintained by each province, similar
management challenges in the forest sector have led to “similar legislative
and regulatory responses across the country,”161 a result of the
corresponding uniformity and small number of forest owners controlling a
vast majority of forests (the eleven provinces), as well as the uniformity of
the industrial profession operating on provincially owned forests. Forest
industry professionals, though spread across various jurisdictions, “brought
with them similar approaches to and ideas about appropriate solutions to
common forest policy problems.”162 Consequently, there is a measure of
continuity and a resulting institutional inertia for both the regulator/owner
of the forests and the parties being regulated/using the forests, leading to a
“tendency towards enacting similar policies in different jurisdictions.”163
These similar policies have led to “extensive management responsibilities”
and “increasingly intensive government regulation of company harvesting
practices” to both ensure timber supply and protect other environmental
values of forests.164 Because of the intertwined nature of the regulator and
the regulated, the process by which forest policy is formulated in Canada is
typically one of private negotiation in a “quasi-corporatist” style, whereby
the government readily establishes prescriptions for forest management,
but with input from the regulated industry.165 Though this negotiative
process might give rise to concerns of a type of institutionalized agency
capture, and though some have been critical of the industry’s maintenance
of “a strong bargaining position,”166 vast government ownership of forests
actually gives the provinces “a special place over and above the usual roles
available to a legitimate government”167 in directing forest policy standards
in the face of industrial inputs.
The symbiotic relationship between the Canadian provinces and the
forest industry also relieves provincial administrative burdens by providing
a direct line of technical and professional forest management expertise.168
Indeed, as administration of forest policies has become increasingly
159
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burdensome, the provincial governments have moved toward including
basic forest management standards in the terms of timber licenses, which
has caused “a gradual shift of responsibilities from overworked provincial
forestry services to large corporations with their own professional forest
staff.”169 Though this does give rise to concerns about the monitoring of
licensees to ensure compliance, at the very least the standards are in
place.170 In addition, in recent years academics and consultants acceptable
to environmental groups have become integrated into forest policy design
committees, whereas in the past only industry and the provinces were
represented at the negotiating table.171
Furthermore, where once
“carrot[s]” were the preferred mechanism for attempts at achieving
compliance, increased use of fines and stronger mechanisms of
enforcement demonstrate that “the regulatory ‘stick’ has been wielded
more frequently.”172
Though the quasi-corporatist nature of the Canadian forest policy
framework certainly leaves much to be desired regarding the protection of
the full suite of forest resources and ecosystem services173—especially the
carbon sequestration value of forests—at a minimum it has helped forge
fundamental, fairly uniform, and legally enforceable forest management
standards across the Canadian provinces. This scenario is very much
unlike the situation in the United States, where major industrial players are
largely not negotiating with the government regarding the extraction of the
government’s own resources (except, of course, on federal and state-owned
forestlands). Rather, those industries and a vast array of non-industrial
private forest owners are managing their own private lands, oftentimes
without any inputs from governments hesitant to place restrictions on
169
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Scholars argue that “[t]he industrial-governmental interests constitute the principal promoters
and users of Crown lands, and their dual goal is to extract as much fibre from the forest as possible
while viewing other forest uses as mere constraints on extraction.” Jamie Lawson et al., ‘Perpetual
Revenues and the Delights of the Primitive’: Change, Continuity, and Forest Policy Regimes in
Ontario, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY, supra note 96, at 279, 281. In other words, a focus on timber
production detracts from standards protecting the full value of forests in the form of biodiversity,
ecosystem services, recreational, and—most important for climate negotiations—carbon sequestration
values. Rather, these robust standards are the very basics of responsible timber harvesting. Climate
change regulation is perhaps the quintessential ecosystem service provided by forests, and the
facilitation of this service would require perhaps the strictest forest management standard of all to be
implemented on at least some portion of a nation’s forests—that timber simply not be harvested at all
on, at least, some lands. Others have noted that Canadian forest companies benefit a great deal from
the international trade in their products, they have been reluctant to commit to tough environmental
standards posed internationally and Canada as a whole has been “as protective of its own sovereignty
as are developing countries when it comes to binding commitments at home.” Bernstein, supra note
99, at 74.
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private property rights. Thus, each state government in the United States
manages, or fails to manage, forest practices in their own way—setting the
stage for a tragedy of the commons in the forest policy arena, as state
governments maximize their own citizens’ use of forest resources in their
jurisdictions to the detriment of a forest base defined more broadly by
national boundaries and that takes into account the value of forests across
and beyond subnational boundaries.174 The large number of private
property owners hamstrings the formulation of higher forest management
standards, while the forest policy disparity across U.S. state jurisdictions
makes anything resembling a national forest policy simply non-existent.
As a result, it is also important to understand the nuances of the publicprivate forest ownership divide in Canada and the United States that give
rise to different levels of stringency and adaptability among subnational
governments in the two countries.
2. A Formula for Stringency and Adaptability: Greater Public Forest
Ownership Leads to a More Stable Regulatory Environment and a
Public Forest Policy “Spillover Effect” on Private Lands
McDermott et al. found a stark difference in the stringency of policy
prescriptions on public forestlands versus private forestlands, not only in
the United States and Canada, but among all of the developed countries
reviewed. Indeed, whether forests are publicly or privately owned is a
strong predictor of policy prescriptiveness, especially in North America,
where “private property rights, including the requirement to compensate
forest owners once a regulation has been deemed by the courts to infringe
upon such rights, make it much more difficult for governments to regulate
private rather than public forests.”175 Thus there is a marked difference in
the stringency of forest policy on public versus private forestlands in
Canadian provinces and U.S. states, though these differences are of far less
consequence in Canada given the small amount of privately-owned
forests.176
Correspondingly, when governments own most of the forest resource
base, as in Canada, they are more likely to adapt to pressure to increase the
stringency of forest policy standards, as “[g]overnments in developed
countries respond to pressure from environmental activists and the
community for high forest management standards by developing high
levels of policy prescriptiveness, and high performance thresholds, for
174
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public forestlands.”
Indeed, given the provincial status as what is
effectively a “landlord” over forest resources, “provincial governments can
set the terms for access to Crown forest resources, impose more onerous
restrictions on harvesting activities, and use more intrusive policy
instruments for regulation than would be tolerated if private forest lands
were involved”178—a situation very different than in the United States,
where private property owners control sixty percent of forests and where
there is a wide range of variability in subnational forest management
policies. Nonetheless, McDermott et al. noted that even subnational
governments with voluntary BMPs in the southeastern United States
maintain monitoring procedures on state-owned forestlands that are well
developed and “subject to greater scrutiny and perhaps higher performance
expectations”179 than are private forests, which, of course, need no
monitoring since there are no procedural or substantive requirements with
which to comply. As described below, this public-private divide has many
nuances, two of which play a role in explaining the stringency and
adaptability gap in subnational forest management standards between the
United States and Canada—a more stable regulatory environment in
Canada and the public forest management “spillover effect.”
177

i. More stable regulatory environment in Canada
In the United States, the vast array of forest owners combined with
fifty different state governments regulating (or not regulating) forests
creates a very volatile regulatory environment, whereas Canada’s
regulatory environment is far more stable. Provincial ownership of
Canadian forests establishes continuity and stability regarding both the
owner of forest resources and the primary regulated entity, the commercial
forest industry in this case. As demonstrated in Section III.B.1’s
discussion of Canada’s quasi-corporatist negotiations, it seems easier to
construct and maintain similar regulatory approaches across subnational
governments when there are relatively few forest owners (eleven
provinces) and relatively few major industrial forest players. This is quite
a contrast to the United States, where private ownership not only makes
crafting regulatory standards more difficult due to constitutional concerns
(such as Takings claims), but also makes it harder to establish consistent,
177
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 346. An example arose in the United States in the context of
biodiversity protection, but directly implicated forests—the case of the Northern Spotted Owl in the
states of Washington and Oregon. After the ESA was utilized to protect the owl in the early 1990’s,
timber harvest on private lands remained relatively steady, whereas harvest on public lands dropped
precipitously. Id. at 92–93, 93 fig.3.4. The government was more willing to respond with regulatory
standard setting, was also more willing to enforce those standards on its own property than on private
property, and was therefore able to adjust course more readily.
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responsive forest policies due to volatility in forest ownership.
In the southeastern United States, large commercial interests have
rapidly divested their holdings over the last few years, resulting in smaller
private forest properties that are “subject to new dynamic forces that
encourage parcelization and fragmentation.”180 Commercial forest owner
divestiture of forestland between 1998 and 2010 is “the most substantial
transition in forest ownership of the last century,” as industry divested
itself of nearly three-quarters of its forest holdings.181 Much of the land
has ended up in the hands of real estate investment trusts, which not only
represent a voting block whose interests are diametrically opposed to high
forest management/preservation standards, but whose ownership also only
exacerbates the concerns regarding urbanization and reduction of forest
cover over the next fifty years.182 Indeed, the Southern Forest Futures
Project highlighted the truism that “[p]rivate owners continue to control
forest futures” in the southeastern United States.183
If then, as in Canada, large commercial forest interests negotiating
with governments owning forest resources generally leads to higher and
more consistent forest management standards across a nation184—due to
economies of scale in industry expertise and interactions with government
regulators—then increased fragmentation of ownership in the United States
may result in further negative consequences for forest management
practices in general, not to mention forest loss by urbanization and land
development activities. Indeed, eighty-six percent of southern forests are
privately owned, and while sixty percent of privately owned forests are 100
acres or more, fifty-nine percent of all private forest owners own less than
nine acres of forestland.185 Family forest holdings in the region average
only twenty-nine acres in size.186 The result is a large number of
individuals who may choose to act “rationally” regarding the appropriation
of forest resources, maximizing personal gain to the detriment of the
subnational, national, and global resource base—either through poor forest
management practices or through replacement of forest resources with
human-made capital in the form of urbanization.187
Ultimately, the Canadian provinces have a far more stable regulatory
environment within which to operate than do U.S. states, facilitated by
more continuity in both the entities owning most of the forest resource base
as well as with regard to the actors being regulated. As a result, the
180
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government may more readily adopt heightened and adaptable forest
management standards applicable to the “known quantity” that is the
Canadian forest industry. Even so, and as next described, public
ownership of forests in the United States is not without effect, as it can
actually help “ratchet up” forest management standards on private lands,
providing further insights into the difficulty of crafting any discernible
national forest policy in the United States via subnational government
volition alone.188
ii. Southeast to Northwest Disparity Among U.S. States:
Public Forest Management Spillover Effect
Notably, McDermott et al. also found that a forest management
“spillover” effect may occur whereby heightened standards on public lands
can lead to higher regulatory standards on nearby private lands. This could
be one factor explaining why more prescriptive forest regulations exist in
western states in the United States—even on private forestlands—since
there are far more public forests in the West than in the East.189 For
example, California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska maintain an
average sixty-seven percent of forests in public ownership190 and also
maintain far more stringent forest policy standards for both public and
private forests (a “6.7” average) than do states in the southeastern United
States (a “1.2” average), where eighty-six percent of forests are privately
owned.191 In other words, “[w]here there are substantial public and private
lands within a given jurisdiction, greater regulation of public lands may,
over time, result in increased pressures from civil society and
environmental groups for greater regulation on private lands.”192
In fact, the United States Forest Service’s “9” score on the forest
policy ranking does seem to have spilled over into western forest policy in
a way not seen in the Southeast—perhaps no surprise since ninety-two
percent of federally owned land is located in the western United States
whereas less than five percent is located in the South.193 Though this
spillover effect is important and can improve forest policy standards on
private lands in states with large public forest holdings, its implications for
U.S. subnational forest policy only provides another example of the
arguable need for national level inputs into that policy. The southeastern
188
See MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 346–47 (discussing hypotheses that may account for
differences in public and private forestland regulation and why and how higher prescriptions on private
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United States simply does not maintain the critical mass of publicly owned
forests that would help facilitate a spillover effect, as again, eighty-six
percent of forests are privately owned. Though other factors, such as
overall governance culture and the limited administrative capacity of
southeastern governments, may also contribute to the region’s lax
standards, it seems that the lack of a spillover effect further exacerbates
continuation of the status quo.
Indeed, in a federal system of government without a national forest
policy, a rise in standards in one area of the country is not without
consequence for resource management in other areas. For example,
heightened regulatory standards for forest management policies on U.S.
federal lands in recent decades reduced timber harvests in western states
while shifting demand to southern forests,194 no doubt in part due to a
spillover effect of public standards on private forestlands near federal
forests. Timber production in the South, where federal forests are virtually
non-existent, increased from forty percent of the national total in 1952 to
almost sixty percent in 1996.195 This again reflects how policy change may
be more readily achieved for forests owned by the government than when
the government must regulate private property owners to achieve those
same results.
To be clear, this is not to say that enhanced regulatory standards on
public lands or those “spilling over” onto private lands necessarily means
less timber production in those jurisdictions. Indeed, a race-to-the-bottom
may partially explain the shift to southeastern forests as forest interests
likely moved to an area that imposed fewer monetary and regulatory costs
on forest operations. In this way, sudden changes in publically owned
forest policy can not only spill over to private forestlands in the form of
heightened forest management standards, but can also shift resource
extraction to another area of the country with less stringent standards. It is
certainly true that this market shift to southeastern forests resulted in
increased economic growth and prosperity for the region—a region in need
of jobs and increased revenues. Even so, the region remains one with
some of the weakest forest management standards in the United States, and
indeed in the world. It also, not coincidentally, is the region projected to
experience potentially precipitous drops in forest cover over the next fifty
years due to that same push toward economic growth and development.196
In the end, this spillover effect demonstrates an increased likelihood of
higher forest policy standards wherever the public forests are—and public
forests are decidedly in short supply in the most intensively managed part
of the United States, the southeastern United States.
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Ultimately, the public-private forest divide in the United States and
Canada affects the stringency and adaptability of subnational forest policy
in the two countries, due primarily to: (1) governments being able to set
more stringent standards on their own lands; (2) governments adapting
more readily to pressure from civil society; and (3) a more stable
regulatory environment and the public forest “spillover effect.” In
addition, the quasi-corporatist nature of Canadian forest policy gives rise to
greater uniformity across subnational jurisdictions. These distinctions in
uniformity, stringency, and adaptability of subnational forest policy in the
United States and Canada contribute to Part IV’s different suggested
mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism in the two countries.197
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In addition, remaining constitutional nuances provide insights into suggested mechanisms for
forging Fail-safe Federalism. Part II already discussed a variety of constitutional nuances
distinguishing the United States and Canada from each other on forest policy and indicating that
Canadian forest policy is even more stringently decentralized than is U.S. forest policy. In other words,
the United States has more powers at the federal level that it simply has yet to utilize to test whether it
could gain greater inputs into subnational forest policy. Another nuance remains, however, once again
arising out of the public-private forest ownership divide. Though public forest ownership in Canada
may give rise to greater levels of uniformity, stringency, and adaptability of forest policy across
subnational governments, these public forests are almost entirely provincially owned. In contrast,
while private forest owners do own a majority of forests in the United States, the U.S. federal
government retains control over a much larger proportion of forests, thirty percent, than does the
Canadian federal government. The push toward “ecosystem management” in the 1980s and 1990s
demonstrates how federalism even affects different nations’ abilities to manage their respective public
forests. At least theoretically, ecosystem management takes into account a variety of natural resource
protection measures when considering forest management standards, including protection of a far wider
array of forest services than those provided by timber harvest alone. For the thirty percent of forests
managed by the U.S. Forest Service, ecosystem management was implemented fairly quickly because
civil society utilized the ESA, judicially enforceable at the federal level, as a hammer for changing
forest policy on public lands. They did so during the spotted owl controversy of the early 1990s that
led to dramatic shifts in forest policy on federal lands. Due to the constitutional limitations on federal
power discussed in earlier sections of this Article, however, Canada does not have a corollary to the
ESA, and therefore maintains no judicially enforceable statutory standard at the federal level requiring
the protection of species on public forests. Howlett, supra note 97, at 47. Indeed, “the procedural
rights of environmentalists [in Canada] still pale in comparison to their U.S. counterparts.
Environmentalists south of the border can directly appeal administrative decisions, and when they go to
court, they have far more formidable tools to bring to bear” than do Canadian environmentalists.
George Hoberg, The British Columbia Forest Practices Code: Formalization and Its Effects, in
CANADIAN FOREST POLICY, supra note 96, at 348, 362. So even though “ecosystem management” has
gained a “prominent place in new legislation, policy statements, and planning manuals” in Canada,
these decisions arise solely out of provincial initiative, rather than because of some external
coordinating authority at the federal level. Jeremy Wilson, Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk:
Reflections on the Early Influence of Ecosystem Management Ideas, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY,
supra note 96, at 94, 94. So ultimately, though this section has focused primarily on nuances of
subnational forest management in the United States and Canada, U.S. citizens’ ability to harness
procedural rights arising out of greater constitutional authority for the U.S. federal government
provides an important insight into the types of Fail-safe Federalism that might be most effectively
employed in the United States versus Canada.
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C. Implications of the Private-Public Forest Ownership Divide for
Suggested Mechanisms of Fail-safe Federalism
The United States and Canada are in very different positions with
respect to fundamental forest management policies at the domestic level—
such as those related to riparian buffer zones in forested watersheds,
forestland roads, clearcutting, reforestation, and annual allowable cut
limits. Canadian provinces maintain high legal standards for these types of
policies on the vast majority of Canada’s forests. The vast public
ownership of Canadian forests gives rise to a great degree of uniformity
across provincial forest policies as well as more stringent standards and the
ability to adapt to newly recognized mechanisms for achieving sustainable
forest management. U.S. states, on the other hand, maintain a wide range
of legal standards for forest management, from high standards in some
states to standards less stringent than those in developing countries in
southeastern states.
Though the United States and Canada are in different positions
domestically, they face a similar challenge internationally, as their
constitutional structures do not currently allow significant or direct,
national-level regulatory inputs into domestic forest policy on a majority of
the forestland within their borders. More specifically, these nations’
federal governments would be limited from participating in any forest
preservation/carbon sequestration mandates arising out of international
efforts to harness the power of forests to combat climate change. For
example, if an international treaty were to require the United States to curb
the projected destruction of twenty-three million acres, or approximately
thirteen percent, of all forestland in the South over the next fifty years, or
require Canada to halt the destruction of over eleven million acres of
boreal forest during the same time period, then these countries’ national
governments would be unable to ensure compliance. It would be up to
individual states and provinces to preserve those forestlands. Yet these
subnational governments face incentives diametrically opposed to
preserving their forests in the form of urbanization driven by economic
development and growth.
As a result, the U.S. and Canadian national governments need to work
with subnational governments to develop fail-safes for their particular
forms of federalism that trigger in the absence of subnational climate
policies related to forests, if they are to effectively participate in the full
suite of options available to the international community to effectively
address climate change. In Canada, such fail-safes are needed mostly to
allow the Canadian national government greater flexibility in participating
in international negotiations related to climate change and forests, though
clearly the national government may also need to develop inputs into
domestic forest policy to curb projected losses of provincial forests due to
urban sprawl and agricultural growth. The United States, on the other
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hand, needs a fail-safe not only to allow greater flexibility in international
negotiations, but perhaps more fundamentally to improve the overall
quality of the highly variable and often inadequate domestic subnational
forest management standards in the United States. So the United States’
need for a federal fail-safe operates on both the domestic and international
planes.
Based upon the above review, however, different mechanisms for
developing federal fail-safes may be more appropriate as between the two
countries. The vast public forest ownership in Canada, the far more
limited constitutional power at the federal level, and the resulting
limitations on civil society’s procedural rights at the federal level198 render
a federal fail-safe in Canada far more likely to arise out of transnational
pressures from civil society, discussed in Section IV.D. Correspondingly,
the greater constitutional powers afforded the United States federal
government as a general matter and the greater amount of forests in federal
ownership in the United States199 make forging Fail-safe Federalism out of
constitutionally validated top-down and bilateral mechanisms, or by
horizontal arrangements among the states, far more efficacious, as
discussed in Sections IV.A.–C.
IV. FORGING FAIL-SAFE FEDERALISM BY FORTIFYING KEYSTONE
CONSTITUTIONS
A variety of mechanisms are available to the U.S. and Canadian
governments for adjusting their respective constitutional structures to allow
a national government fail-safe in the event subnational governments fail
to act on forests and climate change.200 These mechanisms are aimed at
198
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Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters:
The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 31).
There is currently a disconnect in the scholarly literature about how U.S. federalism in fact operates or
should normatively operate regarding certain regulatory subject matter and how it actually operates
regarding other subject matter. This disconnect is illustrated by the two different modes of federalism
in operation in the United States today: “dynamic federalism” and “dual federalism.” Theories of dual
federalism posit that “the states and federal government inhabit[] mutually exclusive spheres of
power.” Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56
EMORY L.J. 159, 175 (2006). On the other hand, theories of dynamic federalism “reject[] any
conception of federalism that separates federal and state authority under the dualist notion that the
states need a sphere of authority protected from the influence of the federal government” and posits that
“federal and state governments function as alternative centers of power and any matter is
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and the state governments.” Id. at 176 (emphasis
added). Yet, neither of these theories alone provides an accurate descriptive picture of the actual
operation of U.S. federalism today. While dynamic federalism might be the status quo on many
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fortifying the “keystone constitutions” guiding these federal systems.
All federal systems maintain written constitutions from which the legal
authority to govern emanates.202 These constitutions provide governance
stability on many levels, and “stability is protected in many nations,
especially those with federal structures, by a special status for the
constitution that makes it of a higher order than other laws and subject to
more rigid rules for change than any statute. A constitution should not be
easy to change . . . .”203
Even though the difficulty of amending constitutions is important for
providing stability in the social construct of governance, when stability
becomes rigidity in the face of a changing environment and the resultant
changing needs of society, reassessment of constitutional structure is
warranted.204 This is especially the case when society also depends upon
the stability of non-social constructs for its success, such as the “natural”
construct of a stable environment—stability that is the antithesis of an
abruptly changing climate. In this way, keystone constitutions in federal
governments lie at the very center of an arch of resource governance.205 In
this arch, one can conceptualize one column as subnational resource
governance and the other column as global resource governance. National
201

regulatory subject matters, remnants of dual federalism remain. Direct land use regulatory authority,
including private forest management, is one such remnant, as the federal and state governments do
operate as if there are separate spheres of governance. As a result, the federal government is perceived
as having no constitutional authority to direct subnational land use planning. To the extent that
remnant dualist notions remain in the United States the remainder of this Article assesses which types
of legislative mechanisms most readily provide viable policy responses, including an assessment of the
constitutional viability of those responses. In doing so, it borrows arguably relic-like terminology of
previous theories of federalism such as “top-down,” “bilateral,” and “horizontal.” These terms must be
utilized because regarding subject matter where dualist notions remain, like subnational forest
management, there may be no top-down federal regulatory approach available, leading to the need to
explore other approaches. Consistent with dynamic federalism theory, however, these mechanisms
may be operating simultaneously at all levels of governance. The dynamic-dual federalism debate is a
moot point in the context of Canadian forestry because dual federalist notions are explicitly delineated
in the Canadian Constitution. In other words, whereas the arguable scope of U.S. Commerce Clause
authority facilitates a dual versus dynamic federalism debate for subnational forest management, the
explicit constitutional grant of authority over subnational forest policy to the provinces in Canada
makes dual federalism the unequivocal constitutional status quo. So the discussions of top-down,
bilateral, and horizontal in this Part are especially warranted in the Canadian context.
201
See generally Hudson, supra note 29.
202
See Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial Interpretation: The
Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585, 587 (2005) (discussing the importance of a
constitution for the purposes of regulating the state and laying the framework for governmental power).
203
Katherine Swinton, Amending the Canadian Constitution: Lessons From Meech Lake, 42 U.
TORONTO L.J. 139, 145 (1992).
204
This reassessment of constitutional structure focuses on the institutional capacity of a
government to formulate policy, separate and apart from considerations of political will, and occurs
within a new theoretical framework of policy success first presented in Hudson, Federal Constitutions,
supra note 2 (manuscript at 59).
205
Hudson, supra note 29, at 3 fig.1.
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resource governance is at the top of the arch. The constitution in federal
systems acts as a keystone in this arch, providing the governance
framework that dictates the rules for resource management on both the
subnational and global levels. If these keystone constitutions allow
national level inputs into resource management on subnational scales,
which in turn allows unfettered national involvement in resource
management on global scales, then they maintain a strong arch of resource
governance, the integrity of which is stable and adequately addresses
resource management across scales. If keystone constitutions do not allow
national level inputs into subnational resource management, and
consequently allow subnational governments to constrain national
involvement in global resource governance—as with forest management in
the United States and Canada—then they contribute to a weak and
vulnerable arch of resource governance that is likely to crumble due to the
legal entrenchment of a resource commons not only within national
boundaries but also internationally.206
As a result, fortification of the U.S. and Canadian constitutional
structures is needed in the context of forestry and climate change. As
discussed in Section A, some of the mechanisms for doing so arise directly
out of national or subnational initiative and utilize existing constitutional
processes. Other mechanisms, as discussed in Section B, arise from
pressures civil society places on governments to take action. Certain of
these mechanisms are more viable in the United States than in Canada, and
vice versa—a circumstance driven largely by the earlier explored
differences in domestic constitutional structure and the split of forest
ownership in the two countries.
A. Fortification From Within: Top-Down, Bilateral, and Horizontal
Governance
1. Top-down
The first mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism is a “top-down”
approach, whereby the national government in a federal system attempts to
use its current constitutional powers to gain legal inputs into subnational
forest policy.207 The top-down approach would either require a direct
amendment to a country’s constitution allowing the national government
constitutional authority, or it would necessitate expanded judicial
206

Id. at 6.
The structure of Section IV.A, as well as related concepts of top-down, bilateral, and
horizontal approaches to adjusting the federal state balance of constitutional federalism, was presented
in Hudson, supra note 200, at 28–29, though that analysis focused only on the U.S. Constitution and
was within the context of land use planning related to disaster prevention and mitigation rather than
forestry.
207
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interpretation of current constitutional provisions granting the national
government such authority.
i. Constitutional Amendment
A variety of scholars have assessed both the need for, and the
effectiveness of, amending the U.S. Constitution to either provide citizens
a fundamental constitutional right to environmental protection or to allow
the federal government to constitutionally regulate the environment with
greater scope than it currently employs.208 Far less has been written about
the viability of amending the Canadian Constitution, primarily for two
reasons, discussed in greater detail below. First, Canada’s ability to amend
its own constitution only recently became a reality, as Great Britain
granted exclusive amendment rights to the Canadian government only
thirty years ago.209 One consequence is that Canada’s procedures for
amending its constitution are arguably unsettled, with some scholars
raising doubts about their efficacy.210 Second, and related to the amending
procedures themselves, amending the Canadian Constitution in a way that
ensures provincial adherence is exceedingly difficult and is so unlikely in
areas of explicit constitutional grants of exclusive provincial regulatory
authority that scholars have simply ignored the question in the forest
management context. Ultimately, for the reasons discussed below, this
mechanism of forging a fail-safe on forest policy is not the most viable in
either the United States or Canada.
There have been over ten thousand proposed amendments to the
United States Constitution,211 and only a few have passed—no doubt due to
208
See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11014 (2004) (questioning the effectiveness of courts taking
on environmental issues in the absence of a constitutional amendment); Dan L. Gildor, Preserving The
Priceless: A Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote The
Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821, 846–47 (2005) (advocating amending the Constitution to promote
environmental goals); Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for Future Generations: An
Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 206 (1994) (“Only an
amendment . . . will be able to resolve all doubt about the standing of a citizen to enjoin government
actions that endanger those resources.”); Pamela B. Schmaltz, Is It Time for an Environmental
Amendment?, 38 LOY. L. REV. 451, 461–62 (1992) (discussing the ineffectiveness of statutory
environmental initiatives). But see J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why
Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 250–
51 (1999) (arguing that environmentally focused constitutional amendments have been ineffective).
209
William C. Hodge, Patriation of the Canadian Constitution: Comparative Federalism in a
New Context, 60 WASH. L. REV. 585, 585 (1985).
210
See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative Constitutional
Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 193, 225
(2008) (describing the amendment procedure as a “failure”).
211
See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169 (1993) (discussing the
likelihood of an amendment to the United States Constitution being ratified); JOHN R. VILE,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING
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the difficulties of passing an amendment via the Article V process.
J.B.
Ruhl has provided an analytical tool for assessing the efficacy and
desirability of amending the U.S. Constitution with an “environmental
quality amendment” (EQA). The calls for such an amendment have been
on the rise in recent decades.213 Proposed EQAs tend to be aspirational and
generalized, as Ruhl describes, including language such as: “[t]he natural
resources of the nation are the heritage of present and future generations.
The right of each person to clean and healthful air and water, and to the
protection of other natural resources of the nation, shall not be infringed by
any person.”214
Ruhl developed a matrix to assess the viability of proposed
constitutional amendments along two axes: a function axis and a target
axis. The function axis describes the institutional purpose of the
amendment, such as whether it: (1) alters the operational rules of
government; (2) prohibits specified government action; (3) creates or
affirms individual rights; or (4) expresses aspirational goals. 215 The target
axis describes the societal interaction adjusted by the functional change,
such as: (1) intra- and intergovernmental relations; (2) relations between
the government and its citizens; or (3) relations between citizens.216 EQAs
tend to fall into a category that no existing amendment to the Constitution
does—that of an amendment establishing aspirational goals (function 4)
for citizen-citizen relations (target 3). Ruhl believes the Constitution is not
meant to include these types of aspirational dictates,217 largely because
they must necessarily be drafted either ambiguously or so narrowly as to
make implementation nearly impossible.
The amendment that would allow U.S. federal government inputs into
subnational forest policy,218 however, would fall into a category far more
likely to be efficacious according to Ruhl’s matrix, assuming it could be
passed in the first instance. Such an amendment might simply declare:
“The federal government of the United States maintains the authority to
regulate the management of the nation’s forest resources; federally-owned,
ISSUES, 1789–1995, xi, 363–80 (1996) (collating proposals by year); Ruth B. Ginsburg, On Amending
the Constitution: A Plea for Patience, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 677, 679 (1990).
212
An amendment must be proposed by either two-thirds of both houses or two-thirds of state
governments and ratified by three-quarters of state governments. U.S. CONST. art. V.
213
Ruhl, supra note 208, at 248–49.
214
Id. at 248.
215
Id. at 253.
216
Id.
217
Ruhl states that “any EQA attempting to capture a normative statement about the environment
and plug it into the United States Constitution is simply a bad idea.” Id. at 252. Furthermore,
“amendments purporting to express aspirational values or regulate civil relations, or do both, should set
off bells and whistles in the political evaluation process.” Id. at 260.
218
The same would also be true for an amendment that sought to allow federal involvement in
land use policy-making generally.
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state-owned, and privately-owned.” This amendment would function to
alter the operational rules of government (function 1) in order to adjust the
target of intergovernmental relations (target 1). In fact, nine amendments
currently fall under this category of the matrix.219 If United States federal
and subnational governments one day agreed to change the operational
rules of government and the current status of intergovernmental relations
by rebalancing federal-state roles in regulating forest management via
amendment, it would fall into the category described by Ruhl as far more
likely to be viable than aspirational/citizen-citizen relation amendments.
Furthermore, though the legislative process is preferable to constitutional
amendment a vast majority of the time, lest the constitution become diluted
and take the form of a legislative instrument, society may be unable to
achieve some policies in the absence of an amendment.220 Ruhl argues
that:
The question of need, therefore, is whether there is any
institutional barrier to fulfilling the fundamental, widely
accepted social policy through routine legislative and
judicial forums. . . . [S]ome amendments have forced an
intransigent minority of states to come into line with the
rest of the nation on fundamental social policy issues
associated with matters traditionally (or constitutionally)
left to state jurisdiction. Where federal legislation cannot
impose the policy over state resistance and the courts
cannot mold the existing constitutional text to handle the
stubborn states, an amendment is the only alternative.
These are examples of institutional necessity, where an
amendment, and only an amendment, can allow the widely
accepted social policy to move forward in society.221
There is arguably an institutional barrier to certain federal regulatory inputs
into subnational forest policy—a barrier in the form of current
understandings of U.S. constitutional law. Furthermore, the absence of
responsible state government management of forest resources, as
illustrated by the current lack of management standards for the highly
threatened forests of the southeastern United States, confirms that an
amendment remedying exclusive state regulatory authority over
subnational forest policy could be a last resort to overcoming that barrier
with the most effective social policy.
Other scholars have also argued for constitutional amendments that
219

Ruhl, supra note 208, at 261 fig.1.
Id. at 270–71.
221
Id. at 271.
220
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rebalance the relationship between the U.S. federal government and the
states to allow greater federal inputs into environmental policy-making in
the absence of state action.222 These types of amendments would be
“purely structural,” unlike a substantive constitutional amendment
providing a fundamental right to a clean and healthy environment, and
would simply “empower[] Congress to legislate regarding the
environment”223 if it chose to do so. In other words, nothing would compel
the federal government to legislate pursuant to its authority nor would any
new fundamental constitutional rights be created for U.S. citizens.
The likelihood of an amendment being effective, however, is a
different question from whether such an amendment is likely to be passed
in the first place. The U.S. Congress has never attempted to harness
current constitutional powers to address subnational forest policy, much
less placed a constitutional amendment on its agenda. So even though this
type of structural amendment may be of the kind most likely to be
workable if enacted, and remains an option that should certainly continue
to be studied, it remains perhaps the least viable mechanism for forging
Fail-safe Federalism in the United States on forest policy—especially
given the difficulty of convincing three-quarters of the states to ratify an
amendment that intrudes on state regulatory powers and given that any
kind of “constitutional environmental amendment is unlikely in the current
political climate . . . .”224
A similar state of affairs exists in Canada. The Canadian Constitution
has only been amended ten times since Canada officially received the
power to amend its own constitution from the British in 1982225—and most
of the amendments that have been passed are province-specific.226 Though
Canada has a formal amendment procedure,227 it was not unanimously
agreed to by the provinces—Quebec voiced resistance to its legitimacy.228
222
See, e.g., Craig, supra note 208, at 11018. Professor Craig argues that “a constitutional
amendment could allow Congress to reenact the federal environmental statutes pursuant to that
amendment’s grant of legislative authority, freeing them of any lingering Commerce Clause limitations
and leaving Congress free to reach the last federally unregulated impediments to environmental
quality—such as nonpoint source pollution—currently deemed to be outside the federal regulatory
sphere.” Id. at 11019–20.
223
Gildor, supra note 208, at 823.
224
Craig, supra note 208, at 11018.
225
The Supreme Court of Canada held in the Patriation Reference case that the Canadian federal
government could gain exclusive authority to amend the Canadian Constitution, though it could only
do so with a “substantial degree” of provincial support. The federal government was able to do so in
December of 1981. Kevin Sneesby, National Separation: Canada in Context-Legal Perspective, 53
LA. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (1993).
226
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
227
Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c .11 (U.K.)
(requiring different procedures for different types of amendments, such as those relating to the
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada or that are province specific).
228
Choudhry, supra note 210, at 222.
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In fact, the rules governing constitutional amendment in Canada have been
described by at least one scholar as a “failure.”229 Fears regarding the
perceived illegitimacy of these amending procedures have caused courts to
actually ignore their interpretation, and even their existence, on some
constitutional questions230—lending evidence regarding not only the
difficulty of amending the Canadian Constitution but also the legitimacy of
such amendments in their own right.
Even if the amending procedures are accepted as legitimate, it is
exceedingly difficult to pass an amendment that effectively binds the
provinces, once again demonstrating the far more robust constitutional
decentralization presented by the Canadian brand of federalism relative to
that in the United States. The amending procedure that would be relevant
to a forest policy amendment would require two-thirds of the provinces,
including at least fifty percent of the population, to approve the
amendment.231 Once passed, however, provinces may opt out merely by
passing a resolution opposing the amendment within one year.232 In
addition, an amendment fails altogether if the amendment procedures are
not finalized within three years of the beginning of the process.233 Some
have criticized this lengthy time limit as allowing ever-shifting changes in
political will, increasing opposition, and election-driven changes in the
provinces’ political make-up to lead to amendment failures.234 Indeed, the
failure of one such amendment in the late 1980s was “particularly
distressing” because at the time the proposed amendment died it “had the
support of resolutions of the House of Commons and of eight provincial
legislatures representing approximately ninety-four percent of the national
population. That an amendment could fail in such a situation, with such
widespread support from popularly elected legislatures, does suggest a
problem with the amending formula.”235
Ultimately, the questions surrounding the soundness of Canada’s
amending procedures, coupled with the fact that provinces can simply opt
out of any amendment that sought greater federal involvement in
subnational forest policy, renders this mechanism for forging Fail-safe
Federalism unpromising. In addition, the political trend in Canada
regarding constitutional amendment has trended in the opposite direction
from granting greater federal power, as “proposed constitutional
amendments, particularly since 1982, have uniformly sought to vest more
229

Id. at 225.
Id. at 227.
231
Constitution Act, 1982, § 38(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K).
232
Id. § 38(3).
233
Id. § 38(2).
234
See, e.g., Swinton, supra note 203, at 144–45.
235
Id. at 145.
230
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power in the provinces at the expense of the central government.”
Not
only would it be politically difficult to persuade the provinces to divest
their current, explicit constitutional authority over forest policy on eightyfour percent of Canada’s forests, but it would, potentially, also be legally
insufficient if some provinces opted out. This legal insufficiency would
fail to change the status quo regarding the Canadian federal government’s
inability to ensure that international obligations related to subnational
forest management are met. An amendment, however, is not the only topdown mechanism available to the United States or Canada. Current
constitutional provisions may provide the respective federal governments
authority over subnational forest policy that they have not yet claimed or
that has not yet been validated by courts interpreting their respective
constitutions.
ii. Constitutional Interpretation
A more viable mechanism for top-down forging of Fail-safe
Federalism on forest policy, at least in the United States, is expanded
interpretation of current constitutional provisions. While the United States
currently maintains constitutional provisions that may be well-suited for
allowing federal inputs into subnational forest policy, Canada’s options are
not only more limited, but as discussed above, the explicit constitutional
grant of forest policy-making authority to the provinces makes expanded
constitutional interpretation of federal powers virtually unattainable.
In the United States, the Commerce Clause is the primary
constitutional provision pursuant to which most environmental legislation
is passed.237 The United States Congress could certainly pass a “Carbon
Sequestration and Forest Management Act” that tests the waters of judicial
interpretation regarding the scope of Congress’ authority under the
Commerce Clause and that establishes mechanisms for utilizing forests to
sequester carbon to combat climate change. To that end, the act could
establish a variety of forest management standards, such as restrictions on
clearcutting, afforestation and reforestation requirements, annual allowable
cut, and stand density requirements, among a variety of other standards. If
such an act were found constitutional, then the federal government would
no longer be constrained by subnational governments in international
negotiations related to climate and forests. Even though private forest
management has long been the constitutional purview of state
governments, there is a distinct possibility that such an act would be found
constitutional as part of the federal government’s suite of Commerce
Clause powers. The interstate markets into which timber resources directly
236
237

(2011).

Friesen, supra note 106, at 1439.
NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY § 3.02(1)
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flow are quite robust. As noted above, timber production in the South
alone, which happens to be the region containing the highest proportion of
private forestland subject predominantly to state jurisdiction, contributed
more than one million jobs and $51 billion of employee compensation in
2009.238 Southeastern forests are “the most intensively managed forests in
the United States,”239 and a majority of the United States’ lumber is
harvested from southeastern forests.240 Furthermore, eighty-nine percent of
U.S. timber is harvested from private lands241 subject to state governments’
land use regulatory authority. In other natural resource contexts, private
lands may be reached by federal regulation of resources appropriated in a
way that has substantial effects on interstate commerce. A variety of
federal statutes regulating natural resources have been upheld under this
test,242 including the Endangered Species Act—held valid even for the
regulation of entirely intrastate species with arguably tenuous connections
to interstate commerce.243 How much more so, then, might a robust
industry like the timber industry be found to substantially affect interstate
commerce? Unlike endangered species, after all, timber is a commodity
that is exchanged on the open market.
Recent research establishes a unified theory for assessing the validity
of Congressional authority to regulate the environment, utilizing commons
analysis to do so.244 Commons analysis demonstrates that the federal
government maintains constitutional authority to regulate two categories of
238

Wear, supra note 24, at 17.
Id. at 29.
240
Id. at 5.
241
U.S.D.A., U.S. FOREST FACTS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 7 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://fia.fs.fed.us/library/briefings-summaries-overviews/docs/ForestFactsMetric.pdf. Carbon flux, or
the net difference between carbon removal and carbon addition to the atmosphere, is fifty percent
greater on public forestlands in the United States than on private forestlands, most likely resulting
“from greater land use conversions and disturbance (including timber harvest) on private forests
relative to public forests.” Eric M. White and Ralph J. Alig, Public and Private Forest Ownership in
the Context of Carbon Sequestration and Bioenergy Feedstock Production—A Briefing Paper on
Existing Research and Research Needs 9–10 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fsl.orst.edu/lulcd/
Publicationsalpha_files/White_Public_Private_Briefing.pdf.
242
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (upholding the federal regulation of marijuana);
Hodel v. Ind., 452 U.S. 314, 326 (1981) (upholding the federal regulation of minerals); Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981) (same); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (upholding the regulation of wetlands by the
federal government); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding the federal
regulation of wheat); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapt. Comms. for Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 708
(1995) (noting that Congress has exercised its delegated powers in crafting the Endangered Species
Act); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (stating that Congress not only has the power to create
legislation, but also to determine the relative priority for the country).
243
Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); id. at
1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
244
Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 379 (2011).
239
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environmental resources that have substantial effects on interstate
commerce: “(1) natural resources contained on land (wetlands, endangered
species, or other natural capital) that are appropriated by economic
development (retail, housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.), and (2)
resources appropriated by individuals and tied to an interstate market
(wheat, marijuana, or other natural capital commodities).”245 Timber
commodities clearly fall into this latter category. Though it seems clear
that timber production on private lands can be constitutionally regulated by
the federal government under this second category, federal preservation of
forests threatened by urbanization—such as the forests in the Southeast—
may even be constitutionally viable under the first category. Any time
commercial development replaces forest resources, there is an appropriator
of the resource tied to interstate markets (the developer) and a resource that
is being appropriated (the forest). These are the constituent components of
a commons, and it is the act of “appropriation” by the developer of the
forest resource that substantially affects interstate commerce and that gives
the federal government constitutional authority over resource
management.246
Either way, if the federal government sought input into subnational
forest policy pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, there are strong
arguments that it may do so—either to provide standards for timber
production or to preserve forests and their corresponding carbon
sequestration/climate change mitigation values in the face of threatening
urbanization. This mechanism is not without complication, however.
While subnational forest management may more readily be considered to
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce than, say, endangered
species protection, it also falls more squarely within the category of a
direct land use activity traditionally regulated by state and local
governments. This is because regulation of endangered species may only
indirectly impact land use activities otherwise subject to state regulatory
authority.247 As a result, passage of federal private forest legislation is
more difficult as a political matter, especially given the current political
climate. The federal government may perceive that it is just as limited in
enacting private forest legislation as it would be setting growth boundaries
around major U.S. cities, a zoning-driven mechanism of land use
regulation currently the responsibility of the states. Therefore, “legal
perception becomes political reality,” as the government politically views
its hands as tied due to perceived legal constraints. In addition, such an
act, even if passed, would be subject to other legal protections afforded to
245

Id. at 382.
See id. at 423–27 (providing a “clear framework within which to analyze the ‘object’ of natural
capital regulation”).
247
Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 2, at 392.
246
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private forest owners, such as the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.248
Even so, it certainly seems that regulation requiring a minimum level of
carbon density on forested lands could be crafted to avoid such
constitutional complications and could further be structured to maintain the
benefits provided by decentralized forest governance. Ultimately, the
constitutionality of federal subnational forest management legislation has
yet to be tested by the U.S. Congress or within U.S. courts—despite the
fact that there are good arguments supporting its legitimacy.249 As a result,
a top-down, expanded constitutional interpretation mechanism may be a
viable option for forging Fail-safe Federalism on subnational forestlands in
the United States.
Canada, on the other hand, maintains a far less firm foundation of
federal constitutional authority upon which to potentially expand. As
noted, while the Canadian Constitution grants exclusive regulatory
authority over forest management to the provinces, Section 91 of the
Canadian Constitution allows the national government exclusive regulatory
authority over “trade and commerce” and residually over “peace, order and
good government” (POGG). The Canadian Supreme Court has construed
these provisions as including the implementation of treaties concerning
trade and commerce and other matters of “national concern.”250 As
asserted in Section II.C, it would seem that climate change would affect
both trade and commerce in Canadian forest products, and it is certainly a
matter of national and global concern. The Canadian national government,
however, has not yet invoked these constitutional powers to justify the
implementation of international climate and forest agreements.251
Scholars have debated the efficacy of utilizing the trade and commerce
and POGG clauses to allow greater federal inputs into provincial
248
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
249
See generally Hudson, supra note 244, at 430.
250
Kibel, supra note 83, at 248.
251
It is true that exclusive federal power in the areas of trade, commerce, and taxation has
“limited the thrust of provincial constitutional supremacy in many resource matters,” especially given
the great number of natural resources that enter interprovincial or international markets. Howlett,
supra note 97, at 39. This was noted above with regard to agriculture and fisheries. See supra Section
II.C. Even though forest products certainly enter into those same markets, they remain separate and
apart from these other natural resources—due primarily to the explicit nature of the constitutional forest
mandates—and the federal government’s use of constitutional powers in the forest context has largely
been limited to mitigating forest management impacts on fisheries or agriculture. Howlett, supra note
97, at 40. For example, the forest practice standards along the British Columbia coast have been
governed by the British Columbia Coastal Fisheries Forestry Guidelines, which “were established in a
classic bargaining process between the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the B.C. Ministry
of Forests, the B.C. Ministry of Environment, and the industry trade group, the Council on Forest
Industries.” Hoberg, supra note 197, at 354. These guidelines established standards for maximum cut
and watershed buffer zones in coastal forested areas, though they were non-binding. See id. (discussing
specifications in the British Columbia Coastal Fisheries Forestry Guidelines).
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252

environmental policy.
The trade and commerce power operates quite
differently in Canada than does the Commerce Clause in the United States,
and “[w]hile American courts have had no trouble reading into their
federal interstate commerce power the power to regulate the environment,
Canadian courts have read Canada’s federal trade and commerce power
restrictively,”253 thus limiting its application to environmental law. The
POGG clause, in turn, has been described as “the poor Canadian cousin of
the American commerce clause,”254 has historically been controversial, and
“its full extent is a matter of considerable dispute.”255 The clause was
“reduced during the middle years of constitutional interpretation to little
more than a basis for federal action in national emergencies”256 and as an
occasional basis of federal authority over matters of “national concern.” 257
Over time, “the Supreme Court has continued to seek limits on the national
concern branch of the POGG power,”258 and national concern has been
subsumed by the doctrine of “provincial inability.”259 Though two cases in
the late 1980s and early 1990s narrowly applied the doctrines to allow
federal intrusion into arguably provincial matters,260 more recently the
Canadian Supreme Court “seems to have purposely turned away from
POGG justifications for federal jurisdiction . . . [and] has preferred to
channel justifications into other enumerated powers . . . [B]y ignoring
POGG justifications almost entirely, the Court is clearly expressing some
reservation about working under the national concern heading.”261
Indeed, as a textual matter, the POGG clause is qualified by a
subsequent clause stating that the federal government may regulate “in
252
See Vincent P. Fiore, Federal Wetlands Regulation in Canada and the United States:
Suggestions for Canada in Light of Crown Zellerbach and the Peace, Order and Good Government
Clause of the Canadian Constitution, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 139, 159–60 (1993)
(discussing the inadequacy of the criminal law power and trade and commerce power to effectively
support environmental legislation); Rodney Northey, Federalism and Comprehensive Environmental
Reform: Seeing Beyond the Murky Medium, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 127, 136–39 (1991) (discussing the
limits on federal powers, particularly through criminal law and trade and commerce powers).
253
Northey, supra note 252, at 139; accord Fiore, supra note 252, at 160.
254
Gerald Baier, New Judicial Thinking on Sovereignty and Federalism: American and Canadian
Comparisons, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 12 (2002).
255
Dale Gibson, Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Environmental Management in Canada, 23 U.
TORONTO L.J. 54, 62 (1973).
256
Id.
257
Baier, supra note 254, at 12.
258
Id.
259
Id. For a thorough discussion of this test, see id. at 13, and Fiore, supra note 252, at 161–62.
260
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, 379–80 (Can.)
(holding that the production, use, and application of atomic energy constitutes a matter of national
concern and properly falls under the power of the Parliament of Canada); R. v. Crown Zellerbach
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relation to all [m]atters not coming within the [c]lasses of
[s]ubjects . . . assigned exclusively to the [l]egislatures of the
[p]rovinces.”262 Given that the clause is meant to bridge gaps between
federal and provincial constitutional authority where a matter of national
concern cannot be addressed by the states,263 the exclusive grant of
authority to the provinces over forest policy could very well lead to a view
that there is no “gap” in forest policy at all. The question would likely turn
on whether global concerns over climate change trigger a strong enough
national concern that the provinces alone would be unable to adequately
address—a potentially difficult argument to make given the weakness of
the POGG clause.
Even so, some scholars have argued that the POGG clause could be
utilized to justify federal regulation of resources over which the provinces
typically maintain exclusive authority, such as wildlife resources, and “on
problems having such unique significance for the nation as a whole that
they cannot appropriately be dealt with at the provincial level”264—as is
arguably the case with ensuring Canada’s forest resources are adequately
utilized to combat climate change. Yet it remains that in order to invoke
the POGG power, “the issue in question must have some ‘ascertainable and
reasonable limits,’ so as not to impair provincial constitutional jurisdiction
unreasonably.”265 Ultimately, the Canadian constitutional provisions that
would be looked to for expanded federal authority over subnational forest
policy are exceedingly weak, and their interpretation has been purposefully
narrowed by Canadian courts over time. As a result, a top-down, expanded
constitutional interpretation mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism in
Canada is not nearly as promising as it is in the United States.
Though a top-down approach for achieving federal inputs into
subnational forest policy via constitutional amendment is equally difficult
in the United States and Canada, it appears doing so via expanded
interpretation of current constitutional provisions is far more likely in the
United States than in Canada. Even so, a top-down approach for forging
Fail-safe Federalism is not a necessary or inevitably preferable mechanism.
While top-down inputs can certainly be crafted in a way that preserves
decentralized forest governance and the role of subnational governments in
crafting either their own policies or policies supplemental to federal policy,
top-down approaches are not without risk. Improperly crafted top-down
262
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prescriptive regulation
often leads to an increasing spiral of tightening
regulations, which progressively jeopardise the viability of
forest management systems through excessive bureaucratic
processes. Such processes impose considerable costs on
both industry and government, and often result in systems
that achieve only the minimum standards necessary to
avoid penalties, rather than the pursuit of excellence.266
As such, bilateral and horizontal mechanisms should also be considered.
2. Bilateral
A bilateral approach to forging Fail-safe Federalism involves the
federal government incentivizing subnational governments to take action
on climate policies related to forest management, which can be
accomplished in two basic ways. The first is a cooperative federalism
approach, whereby the national government passes an act establishing
minimum forest management standards to which subnational governments
can voluntarily bind themselves, while at the same time receiving “carrots”
in the form of financial payments or authority to dictate policy over matters
that might otherwise be the purview of the federal government. The
second approach is one of “uncooperative federalism,” whereby the federal
government uses other constitutional “sticks” at its disposal, such as the
spending power, by refusing to fund projects within subnational
jurisdictions or refusing to provide some other economic entitlement
subnational governments normally receive. Under either approach, the
national government “encourages” the states or provinces to develop
minimum forest management standards aimed at capturing forests’ climate
change mitigating potential. Once accomplished, the federal government
would be free to commit to those standards on an international level.
Unlike the top-down approaches discussed in the previous section, which
are dependent on the respective and distinct constitutional orders of the
United States and Canada, the bilateral mechanisms discussed here are
political or legislative in nature and thus would operate very much the
same in both the United States and Canada.

266
Graham R. Wilkinson, Codes of Forest Practice as Regulatory Tools for Sustainable Forest
Management 2–3 (Paper Presented to the 18th Biennial Conference of the Institute of Foresters of
Australia (1999)) (noting that, “[i]n contrast, a self-regulatory approach can avoid unnecessary
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i. Cooperative Federalism
Under a cooperative federalism approach, the U.S. or Canadian federal
governments can pass a “Carbon Sequestration and Forest Management
Act” (CSFMA) that establishes the forest management standards outlined
above to combat climate change, such as restrictions on clearcutting,
afforestation and reforestation requirements, annual allowable cut, and
stand density requirements, among a variety of other standards. The states
and provinces would develop their own forest carbon sequestration plans
and would voluntarily opt into the program based upon a variety of
financial, political, and legal incentives. Not only might subnational
governments receive funds to implement the program on state/provinciallyand privately-owned forests, but they might also gain a degree of authority
over the actions of both the federal government and adjacent subnational
governments—to ensure that those actions are consistent with the
state/provincial plan. Once a state or province voluntarily opted in,
however, their forest management policy would be subject to the federal
standards established in the act. Finally, as discussed in Section IV.A.2.ii
below, subnational governments refusing to opt into the act might be
induced to do so based upon a variety of disincentives, such as pulling
federal funds for projects within the jurisdiction if they do not opt in within
a certain time frame.
The CSFMA could operate like a combination of the proposed
National Land Use Policy Act (NLUPA), which the U.S. Senate passed
twice in the early 1970s but which was never enacted, and the more narrow
but ultimately (and relatively) successful Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA).
The purpose of the NLUPA was to establish
a national policy to encourage and assist the several States
to more effectively exercise their constitutional
responsibilities for the planning, management, and
administration of the Nation’s land resources through the
development and implementation of comprehensive
‘Statewide Environmental, Recreational and Industrial
Land Use Plans’ . . . and management programs designed
to achieve an ecologically and environmentally sound use
of the Nation’s land resources.267
NLUPA would have provided economic support to states for the
development of land use management plans in accordance with federal
standards and would have further provided data to assist in developing
267
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such plans. Furthermore, the NLUPA would have established a federal
agency to ensure that all other federal agencies were complying with state
plans.268 State plans, in turn, were to designate areas of conservation and
areas of development.269 States with approved plans would have been
required to establish management standards for five types of land-use
activities that were of “more than local concern:”270
1) all development in areas of “critical environmental
concern,” e.g., beaches, wetlands, important
wildlife habitats, and historic sites;
2) key facilities, such as major airports, highway
interchanges, and recreational facilities;
3) large scale developments, such as industrial parks,
shopping centers, and major subdivisions;
4) regional public or private facilities, such as solid
waste disposal or sewerage systems that
significantly affect surrounding land uses; and
5) major recreational or second-home development
of rural land.271
The NLUPA was intended to “establish[ ] a clear role for each level of
government and insure[] that their activities would be coordinated.”272
Perhaps most importantly, “[i]t would have integrated local, state and
federal systems.”273 John R. Nolon has argued that “had such a law been
adopted before the complex structure of environmental law was cobbled
together, the cost, complexity and confusion of the current system could
have been lessened.”274 The voluntary approach of NLUPA, which
“favored incentives to cooperate over mandates to conform to rigid
standards,” was intended to “lessen the ‘needless and costly conflicts
between agencies and departments of the Federal Governments, between
State and Federal Government, and between State and local
268
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government.’”
In other words, this approach could alleviate the
problems created by an overly zealous top-down approach, though it might
also have less bite in achieving results since there is no legal mechanism to
ensure the standards are put into place.
Though NLUPA was never passed, the United States has already
succeeded in establishing a bilateral approach in the land use context with
its Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), passed to gain greater federal
inputs into the protection of the coastal zone.276 Many had hoped the
CZMA would be part of a larger land use management act, such as the
NLUPA,277 but the CZMA succeeded where the NLUPA failed in part
“due to the fact that it both aided development while preserving the
environment.”278
The CZMA program is voluntary, but federal incentives induce states
to opt in.
The first incentive is simply funding the program’s
implementation, the aims of which are:
to preserve or restore specific areas of the state because of
their conservation, recreational, ecological, or aesthetic
values, or contain one or more resources of national
significance; to redevelop a deteriorating or underutilized
urban waterfront[] or port[]; to provide public access to
public beaches, coastal waters and areas of recreational,
historical, aesthetic, ecological or cultural significance; or
to develop a coordinated process for regulating permits for
aquaculture facilities.279
The second incentive is perhaps more enticing from a state or provincial
point of view. Subnational governments effectively gain authority over the
actions of both the federal government and other subnational governments
that it otherwise would not have. After the federal government has
approved a state plan, it cannot undertake any action or issue any permits
for action within the state’s coastal zone unless those actions are found by
the state to be “consistent” with the state’s plan.280 So, for example, if the
U.S. Coast Guard wants to build a new facility within a state’s coastal
275
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276
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zone, though the agency previously had the authority to do so at its
discretion, it now must obtain approval from the state in which the facility
is to be located that siting of the facility will be consistent with the state’s
CZMA implementation plan. The same holds true for federal actions in
adjacent states in the coastal zone—there is a reciprocal responsibility for
federal agency action or permitting in adjacent states to be consistent with
neighboring state plans.281 Currently thirty-four states and U.S. territories
maintain federally approved management plans implementing the
CZMA.282
Though Congress failed to enact the NLUPA, and the CZMA has been
criticized as inconsistent283 and lacks the “bite” that it perhaps could have,
these examples of bilateral approaches to forging Fail-safe Federalism
provide models for how a similar act might be structured for forests and
climate regulation in the United States and Canada. Though these bilateral
mechanisms would operate similarly in the United States and Canada,
emanating from a legislative act by their respective national legislative
bodies, it is important to note that the probability of achieving bilateral
mechanisms in the United States and Canada is not the same. While the
United States seriously considered the NLUPA and currently maintains
one such successful program, the CZMA, Canada has had a more difficult
time even attempting to craft bilateral approaches, especially in the forest
context.
The Canadian federal government established a Model Forests
Program (MFP) that, while not a holistic bilateral approach—since it
operates on a project-by-project basis—is nonetheless a multi-stakeholder
mechanism of forest policy formation that attempts to encourage the
Canadian forest sector to “shift the management of Canada’s forests from
sustained yield to sustainable development.”284 The program’s purposes
are to further “create, by national competition, working-scale model
management areas where a partnership of stakeholders would put
ecological forestry into practice, develop integrated resource management
tools to help commercial forestry coexist with other natural resources,
conduct research, and apply the most advanced forest management
practices.”285 Given the historically closed nature of the privateindustry/provincial quasi-corporatist negotiations, the MFP is aimed at
opening up the forest policy-making process to parties other than the
281
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provinces and the forest industry.
MFPs, however, have been met with varying success,286 with provinces
maintaining low enthusiasm for the program, in part “because of the
federal nature of the model forest project and its potential threat to
provincial authority.”287 Indeed, provinces have been described as
“reluctant” to participate in the programs.288 Any absence of the policymaking branch of government from negotiations understandably renders
those projects ineffectual, and “[a]lmost certainly the federal nature of the
model forest initiative is to blame.”289 As a result, “the experience of the
Model Forest Program gives little reason to believe that such partnerships,
just because they are based in the consensus process, are much more than
advisory.”290 Even so, “[w]hile the Model Forest Program has not led to
fundamental regime change, it does underwrite innovative experiments
which, however incremental in impact, may provide examples of how to
govern future forest management.”291 Despite the MFP being a creative
attempt by the federal government to gain inputs into case-by-case forest
projects, it seems clear that “[i]f long-term solutions are wanted . . . then
process reform will need to be embedded in structural reform,”292 such as a
change in Canada’s constitutional structure that facilitates more viable
inputs by the federal government into Canadian forest policy.
Importantly, the MFP is emblematic of federal-provincial tensions in
the area of forest policy as a general matter. The history of provincial
pushback on federal involvement in subnational forest policy, even through
non-regulatory bilateral arrangements, is quite deep. When the Canadian
federal government commenced a “National Forest Congress” under the
oversight of the federal Department of Forests in 1966, it “failed to secure
provincial approval of federal leadership in the formulation of national
forest policy . . . [and the] government had to acknowledge the limited
direct role of the federal government in regulating an industry dependent
on the exploitation of provincially owned resources.”293 The provinces
even resisted conditional grant programs that would have funneled federal
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money their way in exchange for adjustments in forest policy.
This
resistance coupled with “an inability to overcome constitutional barriers to
an increased direct federal role in forest regulation” resulted in the federal
government ultimately dissolving the Department of Forestry.295
Provincial resistance to even bilateral attempts by the federal
government to gain a foothold in provincial forest policy has resulted in the
aforementioned efforts by the federal government either to harness
international trade, or to utilize a number of international environmental
agreements to gain a foothold, but these initiatives, of course, “have had a
limited impact on actual forestry practices in Canada.”296 Ultimately, “the
new role of the [Canadian] federal government as an agent of international
and intergovernmental coordinator represents a significant decline from
earlier eras,” and “the federal government has lost its ability to affect most
aspects of Canadian forest policy and practices.”297 Given the limited
nature of the Canadian federal government’s influence on forest policy,
this information is not surprising. Considering, however, that these
statements are made in the context of attempts by the federal government
to make bilateral inroads into forest policy, they indicate that even these
types of voluntary mechanisms are not nearly as efficacious as they might
be in the United States.
ii. Uncooperative Federalism
Uncooperative federalism is the “mostly stick” end of the bilateral
spectrum. Rather than the federal government providing “carrots” in the
form of positive incentives for cooperation, it provides disincentives
through the threat of withholding federal funds from states or provinces.
The federal government may withhold federal highway funds, for instance,
as the United States Federal Government has successfully done in other
contexts,298 or it could withhold funds that it normally funnels to the states
to implement other federal statutes, such as the Clean Water Act in the
United States.299
To be most effective, an uncooperative federalism arrangement would
most likely need to be tied to a cooperative bilateral statute. Interestingly,
294
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though the NLUPA was designed as a voluntary program, it had bite in the
sense that it blended cooperative and uncooperative federalism approaches.
For instance, if a state failed to adopt a land use plan within four years after
the act was passed it would no longer receive funding for other federal
programs, such as highway construction or other public works. Such
funding would be reduced by twenty percent a year until the state
developed a land use plan comporting with NLUPA standards.300 Later
amendments to the bill strengthened sanctions even further, providing that
if a state did not submit a statewide plan within five years, then “no federal
agency was permitted to undertake any new action or financially support
any state action that may have a substantially adverse environmental
impact.”301 In the United States, for example, such a provision would
grind commercial development in certain wetland areas to a halt if states
did not pass a state plan, since the United States Army Corps of Engineers
must permit the filling of certain wetlands for development.302
Canada has successfully utilized this approach in the context of
fisheries and agriculture, where “constitutional conflicts over
environmental jurisdiction have been resolved” by subnational
governments utilizing “political and fiscal pressures to bring provincial
practices in line with federal laws.”303 These pressures have “enabled the
federal Canadian government to make significant jurisdictional in-roads
into areas that were previously provincial. These developments suggest
that Canada has been moving increasingly toward a de facto, if not a de
jure, policy of concurrent jurisdiction in the environmental field”304—
though this is clearly not yet the case for forest policy, again likely due to
the explicit nature of the constitutional provisions related to forestry.
Indeed, though the Canadian federal government has attempted to utilize
its spending powers to promote reforestation and other practices on
provincial forest lands, its ability to utilize the spending power to affect
subnational forest policy has been relatively inconsequential.305
As seems to be a pattern with the other “fortification from within”
options discussed above, an uncooperative federalism approach might be a
more viable option in the United States, especially when coupled with a
cooperative federalism statute, than it would in Canada. In Canada, such
approaches have failed to influence forest policy in any significant way
due to persistent provincial opposition to federal involvement. To be clear,
300
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in the United States the federal government has not yet aimed cooperative
or uncooperative mechanisms at subnational forest policy. But given that
the U.S. Congress seriously considered such an approach in the land use
context with NLUPA and has succeeded in a “soft” approach with the
CZMA in the environmental and land use context without state
resistance—and indeed with broad state participation—a bilateral statute
aimed at subnational climate policy on forests might in fact be the best
mechanism available for forging Fail-safe Federalism in the United States
if crafted properly. This is especially so if a top-down, expanded
constitutional interpretation approach does not prove viable.
3. Horizontal
A horizontal approach to forging Fail-safe Federalism would result if
subnational governments agreed with other subnational governments to
take collective action to address the role of forest management in climate
change regulation—even in the absence of a top-down mandate or
voluntary bilateral program. In this way, subnational governments might
avoid constraining national action on global climate governance related to
forests. For example, states or provinces could create regional forest
management plans whereby each agreed to legislate minimum forest
management standards related to carbon sequestration and climate change,
such as clearcutting, afforestation and reforestation requirements, annual
allowable cut, and stand density requirements. Such plans could
conceivably create a de facto national forest policy. This would give the
national government more flexibility during international negotiations
related to forests since subnational governments would voluntarily bind
themselves to a position that does not restrain the national government in
international negotiations, but that rather reinforces the goals of the global
governance regime.
If a top-down approach is a compulsory mechanism for federal
governments to forge Fail-safe Federalism, and a bilateral approach
operates by federal provision of incentives for Fail-safe Federalism, then
horizontal approaches rely almost entirely on the volition of subnational
governments (though horizontal approaches may themselves be induced by
federal incentives). This is the same volition, notably, that currently
facilitates a great degree of subnational government inaction on crafting
fundamental forest management standards in the United States. In this
way, horizontal approaches in either the United States or Canada are likely
low on the list of options for forging Fail-safe Federalism. This is because
the U.S. and Canadian federal governments would have to “wait and see”
if subnational governments forged horizontal forest policy arrangements
before they could assure the international community that any global
standards related to forest carbon sequestration standards would be
implemented. Ultimately, it is unclear why subnational governments that
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currently fail to maintain individual standards related to forest carbon
sequestration would band together to craft standards with a group of other
states or provinces. Even so, this approach should be briefly discussed, as
it is not without precedent, and the regional carbon trading schemes
discussed below demonstrate that states concerned about climate change
do seem willing to enter into these types of arrangements under at least
some circumstances.
There are a few reasons why states might band together to create
“Regional Forest Management and Carbon Sequestration Standards,”
whereby individual states would agree to establish standards that increase
the carbon sequestration potential of private and state-owned forests. The
first is simply federal inaction—which has spurred the creation of a
number of carbon cap-and-trade initiatives aimed at curbing carbon
emissions in the absence of a federal program. These include: the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, including the states of Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont; the Midwestern Regional GHG
Reduction Accord, including the states of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba; and
the Western Climate Initiative, including the states of Arizona, California,
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, and the Canadian
provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec.306 Indeed,
states or provinces may be motivated to tie forest offsets to their carbon
trading schemes in a way that fundamentally alters forest management
standards in order to take account of carbon sequestration potential.
Importantly, however, no regional arrangement on carbon has appeared in
certain regions, such as the U.S. South, indicating that the initiative to
forge these arrangements is still likely to vary across the United States in
the same way that current forest management standards do.
Additionally, if states or provinces are truly concerned with federal
inaction on climate change, as evidenced by the formation of these regional
cap-and-trade schemes, then presumably they would be interested in the
significant loss of forest carbon sequestration capabilities that rapid
urbanization is projected to cause in regions such as the southeastern
United States and parts of the boreal forest in Canada. After all, it seems
that preserving forests in order to sequester carbon may potentially be less
politically contentious than reducing industrial emissions—though
certainly there are private property rights to consider in the United States,
as well as the forest sector lobby in Canada. Even so, if states and
provinces get serious about the threats to forests from urbanization, then
306
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there are strong incentives to create regional forest preservation compacts
in order to head off concerns of a race-to-the-bottom, whereby urban
development interests might flee to other jurisdictions due to forest carbon
preservation statutes in the jurisdiction in which they wish to develop.307
By developing regional forest policy agreements, individual states and
provinces can preserve economic growth and development while also
tackling climate change via forest carbon sequestration.
Ultimately, there is little precedent in the United States or Canada for
subnational horizontal approaches to issues related to land uses, especially
in the forest context. As a result, the availability of horizontal approaches
provides little assurance to the U.S. and Canadian federal governments that
they can commit to international standards. The drivers for such
arrangements, however, are certainly in place, with states and provinces
already taking action on carbon cap-and-trade and facing similar threats to
forests from urbanization.308
The United States and Canada face similar difficulties in relying on
top-down amendment of their respective constitutions and on horizontal
approaches to ensuring Fail-safe Federalism on climate and forests. It
seems that expanded constitutional interpretation and bilateral approaches,
whether cooperative or uncooperative, are far less viable in Canada than in
the United States, where such approaches would seem to be viable and to
have a relatively good chance of success if the United States Congress can
garner the requisite political will to pass legislation. The next section
discusses a mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism that does not arise
from current, internal volition to adjust constitutional structure, but rather
that is created due to external forces arising from civil society.
B. Fortification in Response to External Forces:
Transnational Impacts on Domestic Governance

Pathways

of

This Section will build entirely off of Bernstein and Cashore’s
framework for assessing various “pathways” by which civil society can
influence domestic and global forest policy via external pressures when
governments refuse to take initiative from within current governmental
systems and processes.309 Specifically, these pathways arise from
increasing international pressures on domestic policies that have global
307
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implications, like forest management, as “[t]ransnational actors and
international institutions influence policies by bringing norms generated or
promoted in the international sphere into the domestic political arena.”310
Bernstein and Cashore identify four pathways by which international
pressures shape and change domestic policy. These include: (1) market
dependence, (2) international rules, (3) international normative discourse,
and (4) infiltration of the domestic policy-making process.311
Pathway 1, “market dependence,” is when transnational actors “use
global markets to force policy responses.”312 The most common example
is boycott campaigns, where “a company or government faces market loss
and economic hardship if it does not bow to demands of consumers in
other countries.”313 This pathway may directly bypass domestic politics
since consumers drive the government’s choice to change its policies. In
other words, though “domestic politics influence the specifics of the policy
response, the relationship among the state, business and nonbusiness
interests (the policy network) is relatively unimportant for success because
the coercive force of the market dependence path affects business interests
as much as the state.”314 The emergence of market-driven institutions, like
forest certification schemes, has also created economic pressures in favor
of more stringent forest management standards315 and has “effectively
bypass[ed] domestic regulatory and land-use policies”316 inconsistent with
those standards.
Pathway 2, “international rules,” includes the legally-binding treaties
that are the focus of this Article as well as trade agreements or other
policies crafted by international organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank—which might require countries
receiving funds to adopt environmental standards as a condition of the
loan.317
NGOs or other non-governmental institutions like forest
certification systems can influence the international rules pathway as
well.318 International rules often affect domestic policy, of course, when
“rules and regulations commit signatory countries to change their domestic
regulations.”319 As a result, of all the pathways raised by Bernstein and
Cashore, this is the one most likely to be adversely impacted by
constitutional federalism since “[d]omestic policy-making structures are
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also important when states require domestic ratification of international
agreements or implementing legislation.”320 Nonetheless, despite domestic
governance structures that may limit direct participation at the federal
level, assuming these agreements are legitimately negotiated and arranged
at the international level, they may create a “pull toward compliance” by
subnational governments.321 In fact, though a variety of international
negotiations have failed to result in a legally binding global forest treaty,
these fora have indeed provided a “pull toward compliance” with
heightened forest management standards, as have a variety of non-forestspecific agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity.322
Pathway 3, “international normative discourse,” effectively involves
transnational actors engaging in symbolic or information campaigns at the
international level for the sole purpose of changing domestic
governance.323 An example would be increased international focus on the
inclusion of aboriginal rights in forest policy creating pressure for domestic
change. Such norms, “even when they are not binding on states, can alter
state identities and interests” and “even if an institution appears weak
along one dimension, such as providing binding rules, it may still play a
powerful normative role . . . primarily through moral suasion and
communicative action rather than coercion or enforcement.”324 The
problem with this pathway for the United States and Canada, however, is
that it depends on the “moral vulnerability” of the target state325 and its
domestic ideology and culture. Countries most reachable by this pathway
are those that “aspire to belong to a normative community of nations.”326
Oftentimes the culture of powerful federal nations is a bit self-fulfilling in
this regard, in that the domestic ideology of federalism may trump other
moral pressures as the values of federalism are seen as moral imperatives
in their own right. Even so, one of the most prominent examples of
successful norm influence on domestic policy is sustainable forest
management (SFM), which has been widely accepted (at least on paper) by
governments globally, and includes protection of indigenous rights and
protection from illegal logging.327 Another example is the direct impact
international norms have had on forest policy reform in Brazil, as
international interest in the Amazon and its global value have directed
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pressure on Brazil’s domestic forest policies.
Pathway 4 is the “infiltration of the domestic policy-making process”
by transnational actors, which “internaliz[es] the external influence[s]” of
civil society.329 This is basically a scenario where the policy-making
process is open to a broad swath of civil society, rather than just, say,
business interests. When the process accommodates new and additional
organizations within deliberations, governing officials are autonomous and
free to consider a wide variety of societal needs, and the government can
successfully implement policy choices, this pathway may lead to domestic
change through direct participation of transnational actors. These actors
can “provide resources, knowledge, training and financing to existing
domestic groups, or help organize or finance new domestic-based groups
or coalitions.”330
These four pathways of transnational influence have had direct impacts
on subnational forest policy in Canada, with British Columbia (B.C.)
providing a compelling case study. For example, logging of old-growth
forests in B.C. created a public and media backlash both in Canada and
abroad and, coupled with international pressure concerning the status of
the world’s forests, contributed to a shift toward heightened forest
management standards in B.C. Indeed, the high legal standards discussed
in Part III for clearcutting, riparian buffer zones, and annual allowable cut
limits arose in part out of these pathways,331 which further had a hand in
shifting provincial management to an ecosystem-based approach for
particular forests of interest to civil society.332 Boycott campaigns were
successfully utilized along the “market dependence” pathway and were
especially vigorous in targeting clearcutting policies (or the lack thereof).
B.C. was effectively branded by environmental groups as the “Brazil of the
North” on forest policy.333 In the United States, legislation was proposed
in the state of California to ban B.C. forest products and the New York
Times was under pressure to stop printing on paper from B.C. forests.334 In
fact, due to the United States accounting for fifty-nine percent of B.C.’s
forest products export market, the influence of U.S. transnational actors
was significant.335 Similar pressure arose from other countries abroad,
ultimately contributing not only to heightened standards for subnational
forests, but also to the strict protection of over thirty-eight million hectares
328

328
Id. at 120. Whether Brazil’s domestic forest policies are successfully implemented is another
matter. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
329
Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 309, at 83.
330
Id. at 85.
331
Id. at 87–88.
332
Id. at 88.
333
Hoberg, supra note 197, at 357.
334
Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 309, at 89.
335
Bernstein et al., supra note 309, at 121.

2012]

FAIL-SAFE FEDERALISM
336

997

of boreal forest between 1999 and 2005.
Millions more hectares have
been protected since that time, resulting in a truce of sorts between groups
boycotting provincial forest products and the forest sector.337 Ultimately,
because of the market dependence pathway, “[p]rovincial governments and
industry have been forced to consider new forest management issues and
values such as biodiversity, landscape scale management, wildlife,
recreation, subsistence, aesthetic and watershed management, recycling,
and climate change.”338
Trade laws were utilized along the “international rules” pathway,
though the effects of this pathway on B.C. forest policy are less clear.339 In
addition, the possibility, however unlikely, of a global forest convention
provides another potentially powerful mechanism along this pathway, and
international negotiations on global forest standards may have created a
“pull toward compliance” on the B.C. government. Transnational actors
utilized the “international normative discourse” pathway to inject new
concerns over biodiversity, ecosystem management, aboriginal rights, and
tropical deforestation into B.C. forest policy.340 Finally, along pathway 4,
transnational actors were able to infiltrate the domestic policy-making
pathway through a variety of resource-sharing and coalition-building
efforts among numerous environmental groups—including those
established specifically for the purpose of engaging in domestic forest
policy-making.341 Some of these groups had a direct role in the
establishment of more stringent riparian buffer zone requirements.342 This
pathway has “arguably had the biggest impact on domestic policymaking”
in B.C.343
To be clear, Bernstein and Cashore note that durable and lasting policy
change requires more than just one pathway, as the market dependence
pathway alone, for example, will only result in change as long as market
pressures remain in place.344 Thus, synergies among pathways are of
utmost importance. In addition, a variety of other factors drive specific
policy outcomes, and pathways of transnational pressure is just one such
set of factors.345 Even so, the case of British Columbia demonstrates that
pathways can be a significant contributor to domestic forest policy change
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at the federal or provincial level, or both.
The pathways approach has proven to be a valuable mechanism for
changing subnational forest policy in Canada, and if appropriately utilized,
would seemingly be a viable approach for facilitating subnational climate
policies related to the preservation of forest carbon-sequestration values.
These changes at the subnational level may either allow the federal
government to assure the international community that binding global
standards will be honored by subnational governments already engaged in
such standard-setting, or pathways may be utilized to rebalance federalism
related to Canadian forest policy in a way that allows the federal
government to directly implement international standards. In fact, this
cursory overview of mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism in
Canada indicates that the severely limited nature, if not the effective nonexistence of federal government constitutional authority over subnational
forest policy, leaves a pathways approach as perhaps the only viable
mechanism for forging climate policies related to forest carbonsequestration in Canada—a mechanism initially arising not from the
constitutional authority of the federal government or the benevolent
volition of subnational government legislatures, but rather from external
forces that necessarily synergize to create pressures that contribute to
domestic policy change.
Interestingly, one of the facilitators of transnational pathways affecting
subnational forest policy in Canada arose out of successful efforts by U.S.
environmental groups in the Pacific Northwest to increase forest
preservation and management standards in the early 1990s.347 This once
again indicates how civil society’s influence on public forest management
standards, through the wielding of procedural rights such as citizen suits
under the ESA, can have immediate and significant impacts—a far more
difficult task on private forestlands like those in the southeastern United
States. Indeed, U.S. environmental groups successfully shifting focus from
the Pacific Northwest, with its high proportion of government-owned
forests, to Canada, with its exceedingly high proportion of provincially
owned forests, and having a direct role in increasing the stringency of
provincial forest standards, provides further evidence that such pressures
346
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are more efficacious when the government is the owner of the resource—
further illustrating the importance of the private-public forest ownership
divide explored in Sections III.B and C.348 These groups have yet to
successfully target forest policy in the southeastern United States, with its
exceedingly high proportion of private forests.
Even so, in the United States a pathways approach might also be a
viable mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism for forest policy. In the
western United States, pathways might succeed for similar reasons as they
would in Canada—as the high proportion of government-owned forests
may allow for more sudden and stringent policy-change with a resulting
spillover effect for private forests. Indeed, for the reasons discussed in Part
III, all four of the pathways seem likely to more readily impact forest
policy on government-owned forestlands, as governments are more
responsive to each of the pressures/inputs presented by each pathway.
Similarly, in the southeastern United States, where pathways 2 through 4
are far less likely to be efficacious in spurring stringent private forest
management standards, pathway 1, market dependence, could result in a
shift in subnational forest policy. The huge economic importance of the
forest industry to southeastern U.S. states makes subnational governments
and citizens in the region far more susceptible to market pressures, which,
if properly focused, could theoretically drive climate policies aimed at
preserving forests’ carbon sequestration values. Even so, given the greater
amount of constitutional power available to the U.S. federal government
relative to the Canadian federal government, a pathways approach is more
appropriately left as a reserve option in the United States. Pathways are
more of a “wait-and-see” option in the absence of fortification from within,
as discussed in Section IV.A. While a pathways approach may be a
necessity in Canada due to the lack of any other realistically viable
mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism, the U.S. government
maintains other tools it should first attempt to utilize, such as those
presented in Section IV.A.
V. CONCLUSION
Both the U.S. and Canadian Constitutions allot treaty-making authority
to the federal government for the specific purpose of allowing these
countries to arrange their international obligations. When the U.S.
Constitution was drafted, for example, it was designed to allow the federal
government supreme authority in all international treaty matters because
“state interference in foreign affairs had nearly driven the country to war
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under the Articles of Confederation.”
The U.S. and Canadian
Constitutions, however, also provide federalism protections by reserving
certain powers, such as subnational forest policy-making authority,
exclusively to the states and provinces in order to gain the benefits of
decentralized policy formulation. Though federalism principles are
valuable, they arguably place a disproportionate burden on the treaty
power of the U.S. and Canadian federal governments when and if those
governments garner the political will to address climate change by fully
utilizing each nation’s forests.
As a result, mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism should be
developed to allow greater federal inputs into subnational forest policy so
that federal governments can more freely arrange their international affairs
and can preserve all of the legal and policy tools needed to combat climate
change. Importantly, the United States and Canada maintain very different
domestic forest governance systems, due primarily to disparities in the
entities owning most of the forest resources in the respective jurisdictions
and far less constitutional authority at the federal level in Canada than in
the United States. Accordingly, the top-down approach of expanded
interpretation of existing constitutional provisions and a bilateral
cooperative/uncooperative federalism approach to forging Fail-safe
Federalism would be most effective in the United States, whereas the
external influences of transnational pathways would be most effective at
spurring Fail-safe Federalism formation in Canada.
Fail-safe Federalism is not intended to completely supersede the
benefits provided by subnational regulatory authority over forest policy.
Nor should that policy be completely controlled by the federal government.
Instead, to the extent that constitutional grants of treaty authority are
valued as a means of federal governments arranging their international
affairs related to combating climate change, approaches to forging Failsafe Federalism should be pursued. In other words, federal systems like
the United States and Canada must adjust constitutional structure if they
are to most effectively and flexibly participate in global governance related
to forests and climate. The ability of federal nations to enter into global
governance arrangements to address perhaps the most important global
environmental issue of our time should not be hampered by otherwise
valuable principles of federalism.
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